Tall people and their mango tales

A former CM used to take one week off in a year to rest and recuperate. When I was SDPO, he chose a forest resort in my sub division to do so. When the CM comes visiting, the big dignitaries in the district become small dignitaries. Thus, the DM becomes the usher boy, the SP becomes the darwan, the DFO becomes the forest guide and so on. SDOs and SDPOs are reduced to being mere errand boys. During that time, the government at the centre which was supported by the party in power in West Bengal was about to collapse and the Prime Minister tried to speak to the Chief Minister. However, in those pre-cellphone, trunk call days, the connections could not get established. That was a crisis of epic proportions. The Divisional Commissioner was furious and rushed off to “wake up those monkeys at the telephone exchange,” as he put it. In my capacity as errand boy-cum-announcer, I accompanied him so that I could precede him and announce his arrival in hushed but important, sibilant tones to the telephone guys. When we reached the exchange, we found exactly one guy nodding off on his table. I duly announced. As he was slowly coming to life, the Commissioner started a barrage of abuses. He raved and ranted for almost ten minutes. At the end of which, the guy just said, “Hobe na,” meaning, no can do. Those two bored words put an abrupt full stop to all that sound and fury of the preceding hour. I guess, the government at the Centre would still have collapsed even if the PM and CM had connected on phone that day. 

The next morning, I found that the pilot of the helicopter by which the CM had travelled had taken seriously ill due to suspected food poisoning. Since no one else in the entourage had any problem, I investigated the matter a little further. What happened was, this particular pilot used to think of himself as no less than the CM. He came strutting around and demanded all kinds of luxuries including the choicest booze. By the evening, most of the guys were thoroughly pissed off with his demands. I was told that a Dy SP took an empty Black Label bottle, filled it with the local brew, Changta and palmed it off as the real thing. Even strong men with zinc-lined stomachs shudder at the thought of having Changta but the poor pilot was taken in. The rest was history – or, at least, complete bed rest for a few days. Luckily, he recovered before the CM was due back.

 

Subsequent to that infamous price rise leading to the fall of Delhi government in 1998, in West Bengal, there were daily meetings chaired by a senior Minister. As DCP, I used to accompany CP, Calcutta to these meetings. One day, the honourable Minister said, “Look, West Bengal accounts for the highest potato production in the country. The people here will forgive us anything else but won’t tolerate an increase in the potato price. Let’s stop export of potato to other states for the time being.” Accordingly, we stopped all the outbound trucks transporting potato to other states. The next day, there was an emergency meeting in the Minister’s chamber. Apparently, in response to the potato ban, the Andhra CM had given a press statement that fish export from Andhra to West Bengal would be stopped. Andhra accounted for a huge percentage of the fish consumed here (70 %, I was told). This was apocalypse! So, exports to Andhra were reluctantly allowed, under duress, and all of us were tasked to report the price of different types of fish in each market on a daily basis.

 

In my cadre, there is a system of calling on the senior officers when one joins a new assignment. The system was corrupted so much that in the district where I joined as SP, there was also a system of calling on the DCS, the local big leader of the ruling party. When told about it, I was a little revolted. For me, my senior officers were mai baap, real mothers and fathers. Given that, I didn’t want to acquire excess luggage like step-mothers and step-fathers in the form of politicians so I didn’t bother about the calling on bit. After waiting for the courtesy call, the DCS must’ve become furious. When I went to Calcutta after a week for the calling on with the senior officers, my first port of call was the Home Secretary. After the pleasantries, he asked me what I’d done to enrage the DCS who had gone complaining about me to all and sundry. I said how was that possible as I was only one week into the assignment. Then he burst out laughing. He said, “No, the guy was complaining that your English was weak. When I asked him why, he said, shuddu ektai word jaane, NO [the only word you know is NO]. Whatever his party members were asking, e.g., don’t arrest our supporters, arrest the other side in cooked-up cases, inform us before starting a case and so on, you’re just saying NO.”

 

The District Magistrate and SP behave like lords in the districts. As SP of the district, I used to be invited for some parties. I attended very few of them but used to land up at the appointed time, to the consternation of all. I found that, actually, there are people designated in the DM and SP’s retinue who ring up to find out whether the other guests had arrived and only after that was so, the laat sahebs (DM and SP) would make an appearance. Sounds silly? Actually, we can be very silly.

 

Oonche log aur unki aam baaten. Tall people and their mango tales. 

 

[To be continued]

S & M

 

My brother lost an almost brand new bicycle. It had six gears – the big thing then. It was stolen when he was tutoring a kid for some pocket money. We went down to the nearby police station to lodge an FIR. We waited and waited near the Duty Officer’s desk for about three hours before we were attended to. The Duty Officer was a young guy, very pleasant. He told us ki stationery nahin hai, humein hi lana padega. My brother went out and got back with a few sheets of white paper after about an hour because there was no stationery shop nearby. The Duty Officer laughed. He said minimum one ream was required – how did we think police stations ran! Another one round, another one hour. This time, with a bond of one ream of paper forged between us, he decided to be frank. Chhota case hei, lekin sau rupaiya toh lagega. I had just joined the service and did not know the ways of the world. I bristled and told him I was an IPS probationer. He apologised and said, “Saab, aap IPS hain toh pachaas rupaiya mein ho jaayega.” 

This is a true story.

 

After thirty odd years in the job, I ask myself, has anything changed? Yes. We have big and great management experts at the top “doing” digital policing, sensitisation, proactive, community policing, CCTNS (that never–ending policing digitisation initiative) and so on. On the ground – will a police station be my first port of call if I am in distress? Not at all. It will pretty much be the last on the list.

 

Why should this be so? The default option for police is not crime investigation. The default option is S&M. No, it’s not Sadism/ Masochism – it’s the two most revered words in the police lexicon that outsiders never hear about: Suppression and Minimisation. This is possibly the best kept secret of the force since early British days. What are they, exactly?

 

Like most police officers in a supervisory capacity, my days as a zonal Additional Superintendent of Police used to begin with a perusal of the daily Situation Report (sitrep) delivered at my house at six A. M.. It contained all the cases registered during the previous 24 hours in various police stations under my watch. The first column contained the Special Report (SR) cases. These were cases pertaining to heinous crimes like murder, dacoity, etc which merited close supervision of the senior officers and which could be “closed” only with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of the range. One morning, I checked through the sitrep and found no SR case and breathed easy. Later in the morning someone informed me that in one of the police stations under my watch there was a brutal dacoity with murder the previous night. As far as crimes went, this was the top of the tree, ranking the highest in SR cases, way above anything else but the sitrep was clean as a whistle. I went down to the concerned police station to investigate my investigators.

 

No SR case was registered in the previous 24 hours. So I opted to go through all the cases. The only case was a minor one of someone trying to misappropriate some abandoned property. On closer examination, I found that the property was stolen from a dead body. A minor case, still. What about the body? There was no case because it was filed under “Unnatural Death,” the same as when someone drowns or is bitten by a snake. So, a brutal dacoity when the inmate was murdered was reduced to an unnatural death and misappropriation of abandoned property. The figures look good on the floor of the Parliament and the state Assembly. They look good when the SP or the Additional SP reports to his superiors. Do they look good to the family of the victim? Do they look good to their neighbours? Do they look good to the society at large? This is the second part – Minimisation.

 

The first part – Suppression – is something else. This is when nothing happens. This is where art and human ingenuity meet IPC and Cr PC (Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, respectively). Throughout my career as an underling, as a supervisory officer and as that all powerful figure called SP and DCP, I found that crime is what the SP/ DCP deems it to be. Unlike in other services, cops do not hold too many meetings. There is a monthly Crime Conference by the SP/ DCP where he declares what his objectives and guidelines for the force are. If he decides that dacoities should not exceed 10 in a particular month, the number of dacoity cases across police stations under his watch for that month stop at 9.99 or whatever but do not exceed or equal 10.

 

A citizen is “entitled” to register a case under proper section/s of law. Must this “nudge, nudge, wink, wink” regime continue? What will happen if one DGP in one state will one day wake up and say, no – henceforth, all complaints will be registered under the proper section of law? It happened in West Bengal – possibly under judicial duress, in Jalpaiguri district because of judicial wrangles regarding siting of a High Court and was called the Jalpaiguri experiment. But why be forced? Why not be proactive in this regard?

Mad Monkey III: Smoke and mirrors

 

On December 22, 2001, a British terrorist, Richard Reid boarded American airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami wearing special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms. He tried unsuccessfully to detonate the same but was overpowered by the other passengers and flight crew. After this incident (referred to as the ‘shoe-bomber incident’), the shoes came in for special screening by security staff all over the world and many countries require shoes to be taken off at the screening checkpoint. 

On September 13, 2005, a wheelchair-bound passenger, Porfirio Ramirez and his son hijacked a Colombian airliner after boarding the same at Florencia for Bogota. The weapons used were two live grenades hidden in Porforio’s diapers. After this incident, screening of sick/ wheelchair-bound passengers became more stringent; the wheelchairs were screened separately and particular attention was paid to plaster cast, prosthetics, etc.. This has created a lot of furore from genuine passengers with ailment or disability and has raised concerns about privacy issues and dignity.

 

After an extensive surveillance operation in 2006, the British Police uncovered a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board aircrafts flying from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The explosives were to be disguised as soft drinks. At least seven flights were targeted by 18 suicide bombers and several associates. 24 persons were arrested in this connection in and around London on August 9, 2006. Seven of the accused persons have been convicted. This incident was followed by severe restrictions on carrying of liquids in hand baggage by several countries. Gradually, the restrictions have been relaxed and passengers are allowed to carry 100 ml containers of liquid, aerosol and gels (LAGs) up to a maximum of one litre. Liquids of higher quantity purchased in the SHA can be carried on board only if they are packed in Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs) by the retailer and checked at the aircraft gate. 

On June 30, 2007, a jeep loaded with propane canisters was driven at the glass doors of Glasgow airport terminal by two terrorists and set on fire, causing injury to several passengers. This incident brought to the fore the possibilities of landside attacks and has led to fixed and hydraulic bollards at the entrance to airport terminals, check posts and barriers on the approach road to the airports and permanent obstructions in front of the terminals to obstruct motor vehicles. 

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian terrorist travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Northwest flight 253, attempted to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear by injecting acid into it through a syringe to cause a chemical reaction. He succeeded in causing a fire and a small explosion but was overpowered by fellow passengers. Hitherto, all screening was geared towards detecting metal because it was presumed that detonation could not take place without involvement of metallic device for the charging. However, this incident showed possibilities of triggering explosions without using metal. This led to more emphasis on pat-down search and also reinforced the restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels. 

On October 29, 2010, two packages, each containing plastic explosives hidden inside printer cartridges and a detonating mechanism were discovered on cargo planes in flights from Yemen to the United States at en route stopovers in UK and Dubai. The bombs were primed to be activated by a cell phone alarm shortly before the planes landed. Prior to this incident, security around cargo and cargo planes was lax. However, this cargo could have been trans-shipped through passenger planes also and any contamination of cargo would compromise the security architecture of the entire aviation system. This led the policy makers to tighten cargo security. Cargo was mandated to go through 100 % screening. The distinction between passenger and all-cargo aircrafts for security purposes was abolished. In India, there has been creation of cargo SHA, armed guarding of main entry and exit to cargo complexes and continuous CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) and manual surveillance of airside and Security Restricted Area (SRA) as well as city side proximate areas including car parking area. 

On January 24, 2011, a suicide bomber carried out an attack at the baggage claim area of the international arrival hall of Moscow’s Domodedovo airport killing 37 and injuring 173. India already had entry restrictions into the arrival and departure areas. After this incident, in India, ID proof was made mandatory for even visitors with entry tickets. Many airports around the world started screening and restricting entry into all areas of the airports including areas which were unrestricted earlier. 

On March 8, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared after losing contact 38 minutes after take-off. The aircraft has not been traced and the 227 passengers and 12 crew aboard are all presumed dead. The security response has included mandates for increased battery life on underwater locator beacons, lengthening of recording times on flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, and new standards for aircraft position reporting over the open ocean. 

On March 24, 2015, Germanwings flight 9525 from Barcelona to Dusseldorf was deliberately crashed by the co-pilot while the captain was out of the cockpit, killing all the 144 passengers and six crew members. This led to regulations requiring the presence of two authorised persons in the cockpit at all times and also tightening of measures against insider threat, e.g., security vetting of all staff, 100 % screening of all staff and their baggage before entering Security Restricted Area, etc.. 

These then are the genesis of all the inconveniences one faces while travelling by air. Even so, aviation security remains smoke-and-mirrors. Actually, when good guys try to imagine bad things, they are not very good at it. Like we do our research and development, the terrorists also carry out their own R&D to find newer ways to breach the defences. Plus, they need to be lucky just once, the security guys, every single time; thus, the probabilities favour the other side. A well-informed terrorist knows that there are thousands of loopholes and building a dyke to bulwark it all would bring air travel to a standstill. So, somewhere between bluster and business, between theatre and substance, we, the security guys chug along. Literally on a wing and a prayer.

Mad Monkey II: The game changer

 

The turning point in aviation security (AVSEC) came on September 11, 2001, commonly referred to as 9/11 when four commercial aircrafts which took off from three different airports in the United States were hijacked mid-air by 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists in a coordinated attack; two of the aeroplanes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York both of which collapsed, one aeroplane crashed into the west side of the Pentagon, the headquarters of U.S. military and one aeroplane targeting either the White House or the Capitol Building crashed in a field as the passengers fought the hijackers. The death toll is estimated at around 3,000 and almost 6,000 persons have been estimated to have been injured in the incidents. This was the first time that aircrafts were used as weapons, with devastating effect. Prior to this incident, there were widely variable standards of aviation security enforcement practised by different countries. Countries which were not much affected by terrorist incidents did not imbue civil aviation security with adequate seriousness. 9/11 changed all that. Worldwide, policy planners and governments woke up to the seriousness of the threats related to civil aviation security and to the realisation that no aviation operation is safe unless all aviation operation is safe from terrorist depredations. As a result, worldwide, AVSEC and screening procedures became more stringent and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) sought to initiate measures for closer monitoring. 

Several studies were undertaken to analyse the failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The Unites States set up a 9/11 Commission which submitted its final report in 2004. One Transport Security Administration study found that before 9/11, although there was registered baggage reconciliation with the passengers, only 5 % of the baggage was screened for explosives. According to an FAA evaluation at major airports in the United States, hand bag and passenger screeners missed approximately 20 % of potentially dangerous items.

After 9/11, many countries passed laws to make aviation security more robust and there have been growing “surveillance state” and “safety state.” Surveillance has involved monitoring of suspect persons and groups on a continuous basis and safety state is a regime of a broad range of policies which may include Advance Passenger Information (API), Passenger Name Record (PNR), watch lists, no-fly lists, etc. and coordinated plan for security. Post 9/11 period has seen enhanced front-end screening, increase in security staff hiring, shift of screening from private operators and outsourced agencies to governmental agencies, upgradation and integration of security technology, especially explosives detection systems and improvement of training practices and standards. These new measures included “social sorting” whereby certain groups of passengers were marked out for differential security screening treatment. Prior to 9/11, Germany’s asylum policies were liberal. Investigations revealed that some of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks had taken advantage of this and resided for some time in Germany. Post 9/11, German Parliament passed Air Security Act that contained a number of regulations for harsher security screening at airports and empowered the government to take military measures to deal with terrorism aboard an aircraft. Other new laws addressed effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement. Canada enacted Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. United Kingdom passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. New Zealand enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act, 2002. The United States created the Department of Homeland Security for coordination of all anti-terrorism efforts and enacted USA Patriot Act. The Act gave the government the authority to detain foreign terror suspects for a week before being charged. It also gave sweeping powers for monitoring telephone communications, email and internet use by terror suspects. The biggest change in the United States was the creation of Transport Security Administration which took over the screening of passengers and luggage from airports and private agencies and also exercised oversight on the entire gamut of AVSEC. All the registered baggage was screened for explosives through four methods: an Explosives Detection System (EDS), Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) machines, bomb-sniffing dogs and manual bag searches. As a result, EDS and ETD screen 90 % of the baggage. The remaining baggage was checked by bomb sniffing dogs and manual searches. There was massive increase in recruitment and training of screeners. Post 9/11, many countries assigned Air Marshals to flights. Bullet-proof cockpit doors with cameras were installed to alert the pilot/s of suspicious activities in the cabin. Countries like Sweden, Norway and Finland which had only a system of random security checks for domestic flights switched to 100 % screening. Some airports installed “dirty bomb” detectors.

Both the process and technology for screening of passengers, baggage and cargo have undergone major transformation. All passengers and crew are made to go through a sterile hold area (SHA) where they are admitted only after security screening of their person and hand baggage. In some countries, certain categories of persons, e.g., flight crew were exempted from screening. That has been sought to be stopped. The lists of another category of persons, VVIPs (Very Very Important Persons), who were earlier exempted from screening, have been pared down. The training standards of the screeners have been enhanced. Many countries have introduced body scanners and specialised detectors to “recognise” certain types of threats. Bigger airports have introduced in-line baggage screening HBS systems to screen registered baggage. Cargo screening agents have been brought under the regulatory and audit ambit of the security regulators of the country. Some countries have introduced a cargo SHA also.

Mad Monkey: Why oh why?

Why all this nonsense? All that I want to do is go from point A to point B. Fast. And, I’m paying for it. Why must I land up at the airport three hours early for a two-hour flight? Why should I stop my car so many times and get checked? Why so many checkings – on the road, at the gate, at the counter, at the interminable queues, at the aircraft? What is the thing about shoes? And my water bottle, and my shaving gel and my torchlight …? Who decides all these ridiculous things? And why? 

There is actually a reason all these things happen. Not all of it started in one go by some Mad Monkey Kung Fu who got up one day and said, “Hey, from today on, I’ll really put all air travellers to all possible types of torture!” 

On December 17, 1973, a Pan Am aircraft (flight 110) was attacked by PLO terrorists on the tarmac in Rome with weapons removed from hand luggage, killing 44 and destroying the aircraft. This led to pre-flight checks of aircrafts. In 1973, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States issued an emergency rule mandating screening of all passengers and hand baggage. Other countries followed the same in short order. 

Efforts to develop explosives detection equipment followed a bomb explosion through dynamite sticks placed in lockers at La Guardia airport in New York on December 29, 1975 near the Trans World Airlines (TWA) baggage reclaim terminal killing 11 people and seriously injuring 74 others. After this, FAA increased its efforts to develop the explosives detection capabilities and minimise the chances of “bombs in bags.”

On June 23, 1985, Air India flight 182 on Montreal-London-Delhi-Bombay route disintegrated mid-air over the Atlantic killing all 329 people aboard. This is considered “one of the worst (tragedies) in the aviation history.” In just an hour from then, another bomb on another Air India flight from Tokyo to Mumbai went off during luggage transfer at the Tokyo airport and killed two baggage handlers. These two were coordinated attacks through bombs in registered baggage which was unaccompanied. This incident led to stricter baggage screening, baggage identification and baggage reconciliation by the passengers. Unaccompanied baggage started getting discouraged or screened vigorously. 

On December 27, 1985, there were simultaneous attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna where El Al (Israeli airline) passengers were targeted in the check-in area of the airports. In the attacks, 19 civilians and four terrorists were killed and 140 civilians were injured. This incident led to armed guards being deployed in check-in areas. In India, armed personnel of the access control unit are deployed not only in the check-in area but also on the concourse foyer before entry into the terminal building. Some airports also have Quick Response Teams (QRTs) outside the airports. 

The 1980s witnessed increasing number of sabotage of civil aircrafts by terrorists. In 1985, there were 13 such acts killing 473 people. On December 21, 1988, a Boeing 747 aircraft of Pan Am airways flight PA 103 met with explosion over Scotland resulting in the death of all its 259 passengers and crew and 11 residents of Lockerbie. The destruction was caused by using SEMTEX, a high-performance plastic explosive. Thermal Neutron Activation (TNA) systems for detecting explosives were introduced in 1988. On December 19, 1987, FAA also required positive passenger bag matching for all international flights unless such unmatched bag had been physically searched. 

On December 24, 1994, Air France flight 8969 was hijacked at Algiers. Three passengers and all the four hijackers were killed in armed action at Marseille. The hijackers had gained access to the aircraft by dressing as policemen with Air Algerie logo. This incident highlighted the danger of “insider threat” and as a response, airport staff were mandated to be screened while entering restricted areas of the airport. Further, the background and antecedent checks of the employees were tightened. 

December 24, 1999 saw the last hijacking incident involving an Indian carrier when Indian Airlines flight IC-814 flying from Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India) was hijacked to Kandahar (Afghanistan) and the passengers held hostage were reportedly released in exchange for some convicted terrorists and a large amount of cash. In this case, enquiry revealed that weapons and ammunition were supplied to the terrorists in the tarmac area. This incident highlighted deficiency in the pre-embarkation security checks and in-flight security measures. In response, India moved to gradually inducting a single force, CISF for access control and security screening of passengers and hand baggage, mandatory secondary ladder point checking at certain airports, in-flight security officers (IFSOs or Air Marshals) and a security fee to be levied on passengers. 

On December 4, 2000, a Sabena Airbus flight, while approaching Bubjumbura airport, Burundi, was shot at by machine gun fire injuring two passengers and damaging the plane. This brought into focus the importance of funnel area guarding. In many countries, this area is at least kept under surveillance by the security forces. 

On July 24, 2001, six suicide bombers of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) carried out an attack on Colombo airport and destroyed several empty aircrafts. The incident resulted in loss of aircrafts costing USD 450 million, slowdown of the Sri Lankan economy and drop in tourism. This incident led to QRTs being deployed at major airports in many countries which also deployed barriers on the approach road for checking and deterrence. 

All the above incidents and the security responses were mere chicken feed compared to what happened on September 11, 2001, commonly known as 9/11. That calls for another blog.

BCAS, Who?

 

BCAS, Who? That was the question many of my friends and colleagues asked me when I told them I was going to join BCAS. The full form is Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, an attached office under Ministry of Civil Aviation to regulate the security of civil aviation in India.

Recently, the organisation commemorated its 37th Raising Day. The occasion led me to ponder over what BCAS has done over its long existence and whether it has led to securing air travel better. I have been amazed about two things. For all its low profile, much earlier than 9/11, it had put into place a lot of systems which the world woke up to only after 9/11. Second, India was and still is fairly behind the curve in terms of technology but the BCAS systems were achieving the outcomes pretty well in the absence of the fancy technology.

Much like the rest of the world, in India also, security was as varied and variable from airport to airport as there were opinions and relative importance given to it. Each airport had a different access control system, manned by personnel largely drawn from the local police. The composition of the force did not follow any set pattern and seemed more dependent on whims and fancies of senior officers and exigencies. For example, when I was Superintendent of Police, Calcutta Airport in 1995, I was intrigued to find that the domestic airport security was manned by local police, the international airport was manned by CRPF, the perimeter was guarded by Eastern Frontier Rifles and the immigration was manned by Calcutta Police although the airport was not even in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police.

I asked the airport Director why Calcutta Police was manning the immigration when it was not in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police. He told me that one evening he was chatting with the state Home Secretary and casually mentioned that the khaki uniform looked a little soiled and could there be a different colour like white. Overnight, the West Bengal Police personnel were replaced by those from Calcutta Police just because their uniform was white. The airport Director of course did not know the intricacies of Police jurisdiction, legal problems, problems arising out of multiplicity of force (i.e., lack of accountability, cross-purpose working), etc.. Point is, with multiple forces and multiple systems at each of the airports, no airport remains safe even if the forces and systems are top class. A compromise in the security architecture in one airport affects the whole aviation security in the country because the planes fly from and to airports. If a weapon or an explosive device or a terrorist gets into the system at one airport, it or he has access to restricted areas of pretty much all of the aviation sector. The decision to have one force for all the airports in the country was taken before 9/11 happened. Hence we see CISF, its airport security group specialising in aviation security, at most airports. The process is not complete yet but we are slowly getting there.

Long, long back, when I boarded a plane for the first time, in Guwahati, I was concerned when I had to part with my registered baggage. What if someone made off with it? I would be landing in Calcutta without even a toothbrush ... However, trusting fate and providence, I got into the plane with a heavy heart, struggled with the seat belt for a while and then settled down. Suddenly, there was an announcement for me to get down and I panicked. Neatly laid out on the tarmac was my battered but beloved suitcase. The airline guy informed that all the other bags were loaded but mine was not because I had not identified it as mine. I simply did not know the requirement. The idea was, mostly, terrorists do not themselves want to die. If the bag travelled with him, it was less likely to contain material for interference in civil aviation. India had it then. Baggage identification and reconciliation became the norm in much of the world much later.

Till date, many countries in the world still have not managed to put in place a system whereby 100 % screening of persons and cargo entering the secure part of the aviation system has been achieved. BCAS mandated it and achieved it long ago.

The above are just two examples. Many other systems which have been in place in India cannot be discussed here due to security considerations.

Technology is good but can we achieve the same outcomes without it?

Perimeter intrusion detection system was the buzzword a while ago. India also acquired it but in a limited way. Till date, the technology has not proved a good enough substitute for the human pair of eyes from a watch tower introduced by BCAS long ago.

Much was written about the stupidity of the jawan putting a stamp on the hand baggage tag when passengers were being screened. “Silly bits of paper with an elastic attached” is how Chetan Bhagat described the baggage tags in his article, “India – stupid, India – smart” in the Times of India. He went on to describe how a really smart terrorist can dodge the system by hiding an unstamped bag in a bigger, stamped bag, and so on. Fact is, no security system is foolproof – layers of security always need to be piled on top of each other to reduce the possibility of a threat passing through. That is why one is sometimes checked at the main entrance, compulsorily at the screening point, and many times, again before the boarding. Then, what about the jawan himself? Does he come from some exotic planet where everything is unsullied and pure as the driven snow? No, he comes from the same place you and I come from – our diverse society with its follies and foibles and large parts of it militancy infested and small parts of it radicalised. He also has his family and loved ones who can be compromised or put under threat. If the jawan is compromised, no system will be able to check the depredations. The terrorist does not even have to be smart. That stamp used to have certain secret features which identified the screener and made him accountable and less susceptible to compromise. In a hijacking situation, at Amritsar involving Indian Airlines flight IC 427, there was armed intervention by the security forces and a terrorist was killed. From the stamp on his boarding card, the screener who had let in two pistols with him was identified and apprehended. Was the stamping system stupid? No, I think, it was pretty smart actually. And, it cost very little, way less than all those fancy CCTV cameras and so on  whose efficacy for detecting a mischievous act by the screener is doubtful, at best.

Well, I resisted all the pressures to do away with the system, even incurring the wrath of the Minister. However, after I left the organisation, the system has been stopped. I doubt if anyone benefited from it. Meanwhile, the aviation security architecture is one layer less.

 

To all, all thanks

 

When I started the blog, I didn’t know how to go about it or whether anyone will bother to read it. Tentatively, I put out a post on Cricket but didn’t circulate the link. Around the third or fourth post, very hesitatingly, I sent the link to a small WhatsApp group, my M. Phil. batchmates. The results were overwhelming. The first day itself garnered 200 page views and one of the batchmates posted that she liked the very first one (about Cricket) the best. Even so, diffidence augmented hesitation and I just kept posting, hoping that no one, not even me, can produce 52 rank bad blogs (yes, my outer limit was carrying on for a year of weekly posts). 

One particular post about Police corruption went viral (by my low standards!) – in fact, I got scared when some readers started tagging PMO and HMO in their tweet feeds. The other turning point was when one of the posts (about Purulia arms drop case) was appreciated by my senior colleagues whom I’ve always looked up to.

 

Sometime back, the blog crossed 10,000 page views, even though I’m still short of the original target of 52 posts. In the context of money, people say making the first million is hard and the other millions follow. I guess, in terms of blogs, the first 10,000 page views is a bit of a landmark and I hope to cross a million someday. A collection of the blog posts has now seen the light of print in the form of a book, Police in Blunderland.

 

The heat map of the readership includes 20 countries and another 218 page views under “others.” The listed countries include USA at second place, UAE (for some reason) third, UK, Singapore, Australia, Sudan, New Zealand, Hong Kong and even some South American countries.

 

Here are some of the encouraging feedback about the blog and the book – Haven’t taken their permission to publish but, I hope, they won’t mind:

 

“Lovely blog. Reminded me of my days across Hindu. The 2 colleges across each other had only one thing in common, and that was the great Jai Singh dhaba. I'm in full agreement that Jai Singh's bun omis and chai had nurtured countless civil servants from DU. Hoping to read part 2 of the blog.”

 

“I had almost forgotten this case, one such sensational case amongst many cases with wider, international ramifications handled esp during my tenure as Commissioner of Police, Bengaluru … Let's wait for the mystery to be solved”

 

“Congratulations Bibhuti. An excellent blog. One of the best that I have read written by a policeman. I am looking forward to reading your other blogs.”

 

“After several weeks I opened the posts of our friends and tried to pick up the thread.  I am happy to go through your extremely readable blog. Your penmanship is rather uncommon. Please complete the story and be on the lookout for new stories. It gave a new dimension to police investigation. We are accustomed to chase dacoits/ Naxalites across villages, districts, states; but the very prospect of chasing them across the sub-continent and continents will make old officers like me rather diffident. I have read your write up with delight for its language and with professional pride for achievement.”

 

“Dash uses a 'tongue in cheek' narrative style of personal experiences in the IPS which makes the blog highly readable.”

 

“He is back from the Valley of the Forgotten Dead

Where he had gone on a sabbatical from being "annoyed"

(As the Rt Hon'ble ROI had once said)

A protracted time off we fans did but dread

To regale us once again with his words so well expressed

In a delirium of joy are we, the blessed.”

 

“As always, your blogs never fail to surprise. This one was an exceptional one and as I read it, I suddenly realised I was sitting on the edge of my seat! This particular episode has all the ingredients for a great film on Netflix …”

 

“Coming from a retired IPS is so breath taking, though we know or face most of these as commoners, however, hardly can do anything to change the system. I had filed a case against a constable and when the officers from Lalbazar visited my home to congratulate me for my courage and praise my parents for raising such a fearless kid, I was immediately forced by my family to withdraw the case for my safety ... One of the reasons why I could ultimately get the permission to move to Bangalore.”

 

“Very beautiful piece, Dash sahab! It unfolds like a classic scene from a Satyajit Ray film. The Socio-economic conditions of real India--with all its iniquities and contradictions could not have been more graphically described! It evokes both hope and despair! Hope, that in the dark and almost lost India, far from the Metros, individual beacons of light can be found working selflessly in the form of "Kalpataru Sir"! And despair, in that, promise and talent which "Hari" signified can be so brutally discouraged by the cruel and unjust social system!”

 

“This book is a collection of blog posts and articles written by celebrated IPS officer B.B. Dash. Among other posts, Shri Dash headed the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security and retired as Director General of Police. Though most of the articles relate to police and policing, there are a few articles about college life (Sh Dash attended Hindu College and IIM Banglore), his corporate career, and his two UN deputations. His writing is entertaining as well as informative. There are many hilarious takes on policing and life. There is not one dull page in the whole book.”

 

“All along I had thought of police and policing as dry and boring. But truly there is a lighter side to everything. The writer has narrated about the police and policing with intelligent humour which makes it very interesting. Incidentally, I finished the book in a single sitting.”

The one response which made the journey truly worth it:

 

”Sir, I am a pass-out of ... PGP batch. I recently lost my wife to a massive cardiac arrest. As I struggle to cope with this loss with my 8-year-old daughter, I seem to miss happiness in life. Your article, well written as it is, brought back childhood memories and a very rare smile today. Wanted to say thanks🙏🏻”

To all, all thanks. 🙏🏻🙏🏻🙏🏻