Mad Monkey III: Smoke and mirrors

 

On December 22, 2001, a British terrorist, Richard Reid boarded American airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami wearing special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms. He tried unsuccessfully to detonate the same but was overpowered by the other passengers and flight crew. After this incident (referred to as the ‘shoe-bomber incident’), the shoes came in for special screening by security staff all over the world and many countries require shoes to be taken off at the screening checkpoint. 

On September 13, 2005, a wheelchair-bound passenger, Porfirio Ramirez and his son hijacked a Colombian airliner after boarding the same at Florencia for Bogota. The weapons used were two live grenades hidden in Porforio’s diapers. After this incident, screening of sick/ wheelchair-bound passengers became more stringent; the wheelchairs were screened separately and particular attention was paid to plaster cast, prosthetics, etc.. This has created a lot of furore from genuine passengers with ailment or disability and has raised concerns about privacy issues and dignity.

 

After an extensive surveillance operation in 2006, the British Police uncovered a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board aircrafts flying from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The explosives were to be disguised as soft drinks. At least seven flights were targeted by 18 suicide bombers and several associates. 24 persons were arrested in this connection in and around London on August 9, 2006. Seven of the accused persons have been convicted. This incident was followed by severe restrictions on carrying of liquids in hand baggage by several countries. Gradually, the restrictions have been relaxed and passengers are allowed to carry 100 ml containers of liquid, aerosol and gels (LAGs) up to a maximum of one litre. Liquids of higher quantity purchased in the SHA can be carried on board only if they are packed in Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs) by the retailer and checked at the aircraft gate. 

On June 30, 2007, a jeep loaded with propane canisters was driven at the glass doors of Glasgow airport terminal by two terrorists and set on fire, causing injury to several passengers. This incident brought to the fore the possibilities of landside attacks and has led to fixed and hydraulic bollards at the entrance to airport terminals, check posts and barriers on the approach road to the airports and permanent obstructions in front of the terminals to obstruct motor vehicles. 

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian terrorist travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Northwest flight 253, attempted to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear by injecting acid into it through a syringe to cause a chemical reaction. He succeeded in causing a fire and a small explosion but was overpowered by fellow passengers. Hitherto, all screening was geared towards detecting metal because it was presumed that detonation could not take place without involvement of metallic device for the charging. However, this incident showed possibilities of triggering explosions without using metal. This led to more emphasis on pat-down search and also reinforced the restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels. 

On October 29, 2010, two packages, each containing plastic explosives hidden inside printer cartridges and a detonating mechanism were discovered on cargo planes in flights from Yemen to the United States at en route stopovers in UK and Dubai. The bombs were primed to be activated by a cell phone alarm shortly before the planes landed. Prior to this incident, security around cargo and cargo planes was lax. However, this cargo could have been trans-shipped through passenger planes also and any contamination of cargo would compromise the security architecture of the entire aviation system. This led the policy makers to tighten cargo security. Cargo was mandated to go through 100 % screening. The distinction between passenger and all-cargo aircrafts for security purposes was abolished. In India, there has been creation of cargo SHA, armed guarding of main entry and exit to cargo complexes and continuous CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) and manual surveillance of airside and Security Restricted Area (SRA) as well as city side proximate areas including car parking area. 

On January 24, 2011, a suicide bomber carried out an attack at the baggage claim area of the international arrival hall of Moscow’s Domodedovo airport killing 37 and injuring 173. India already had entry restrictions into the arrival and departure areas. After this incident, in India, ID proof was made mandatory for even visitors with entry tickets. Many airports around the world started screening and restricting entry into all areas of the airports including areas which were unrestricted earlier. 

On March 8, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared after losing contact 38 minutes after take-off. The aircraft has not been traced and the 227 passengers and 12 crew aboard are all presumed dead. The security response has included mandates for increased battery life on underwater locator beacons, lengthening of recording times on flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, and new standards for aircraft position reporting over the open ocean. 

On March 24, 2015, Germanwings flight 9525 from Barcelona to Dusseldorf was deliberately crashed by the co-pilot while the captain was out of the cockpit, killing all the 144 passengers and six crew members. This led to regulations requiring the presence of two authorised persons in the cockpit at all times and also tightening of measures against insider threat, e.g., security vetting of all staff, 100 % screening of all staff and their baggage before entering Security Restricted Area, etc.. 

These then are the genesis of all the inconveniences one faces while travelling by air. Even so, aviation security remains smoke-and-mirrors. Actually, when good guys try to imagine bad things, they are not very good at it. Like we do our research and development, the terrorists also carry out their own R&D to find newer ways to breach the defences. Plus, they need to be lucky just once, the security guys, every single time; thus, the probabilities favour the other side. A well-informed terrorist knows that there are thousands of loopholes and building a dyke to bulwark it all would bring air travel to a standstill. So, somewhere between bluster and business, between theatre and substance, we, the security guys chug along. Literally on a wing and a prayer.

Mad Monkey: Why oh why?

Why all this nonsense? All that I want to do is go from point A to point B. Fast. And, I’m paying for it. Why must I land up at the airport three hours early for a two-hour flight? Why should I stop my car so many times and get checked? Why so many checkings – on the road, at the gate, at the counter, at the interminable queues, at the aircraft? What is the thing about shoes? And my water bottle, and my shaving gel and my torchlight …? Who decides all these ridiculous things? And why? 

There is actually a reason all these things happen. Not all of it started in one go by some Mad Monkey Kung Fu who got up one day and said, “Hey, from today on, I’ll really put all air travellers to all possible types of torture!” 

On December 17, 1973, a Pan Am aircraft (flight 110) was attacked by PLO terrorists on the tarmac in Rome with weapons removed from hand luggage, killing 44 and destroying the aircraft. This led to pre-flight checks of aircrafts. In 1973, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States issued an emergency rule mandating screening of all passengers and hand baggage. Other countries followed the same in short order. 

Efforts to develop explosives detection equipment followed a bomb explosion through dynamite sticks placed in lockers at La Guardia airport in New York on December 29, 1975 near the Trans World Airlines (TWA) baggage reclaim terminal killing 11 people and seriously injuring 74 others. After this, FAA increased its efforts to develop the explosives detection capabilities and minimise the chances of “bombs in bags.”

On June 23, 1985, Air India flight 182 on Montreal-London-Delhi-Bombay route disintegrated mid-air over the Atlantic killing all 329 people aboard. This is considered “one of the worst (tragedies) in the aviation history.” In just an hour from then, another bomb on another Air India flight from Tokyo to Mumbai went off during luggage transfer at the Tokyo airport and killed two baggage handlers. These two were coordinated attacks through bombs in registered baggage which was unaccompanied. This incident led to stricter baggage screening, baggage identification and baggage reconciliation by the passengers. Unaccompanied baggage started getting discouraged or screened vigorously. 

On December 27, 1985, there were simultaneous attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna where El Al (Israeli airline) passengers were targeted in the check-in area of the airports. In the attacks, 19 civilians and four terrorists were killed and 140 civilians were injured. This incident led to armed guards being deployed in check-in areas. In India, armed personnel of the access control unit are deployed not only in the check-in area but also on the concourse foyer before entry into the terminal building. Some airports also have Quick Response Teams (QRTs) outside the airports. 

The 1980s witnessed increasing number of sabotage of civil aircrafts by terrorists. In 1985, there were 13 such acts killing 473 people. On December 21, 1988, a Boeing 747 aircraft of Pan Am airways flight PA 103 met with explosion over Scotland resulting in the death of all its 259 passengers and crew and 11 residents of Lockerbie. The destruction was caused by using SEMTEX, a high-performance plastic explosive. Thermal Neutron Activation (TNA) systems for detecting explosives were introduced in 1988. On December 19, 1987, FAA also required positive passenger bag matching for all international flights unless such unmatched bag had been physically searched. 

On December 24, 1994, Air France flight 8969 was hijacked at Algiers. Three passengers and all the four hijackers were killed in armed action at Marseille. The hijackers had gained access to the aircraft by dressing as policemen with Air Algerie logo. This incident highlighted the danger of “insider threat” and as a response, airport staff were mandated to be screened while entering restricted areas of the airport. Further, the background and antecedent checks of the employees were tightened. 

December 24, 1999 saw the last hijacking incident involving an Indian carrier when Indian Airlines flight IC-814 flying from Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India) was hijacked to Kandahar (Afghanistan) and the passengers held hostage were reportedly released in exchange for some convicted terrorists and a large amount of cash. In this case, enquiry revealed that weapons and ammunition were supplied to the terrorists in the tarmac area. This incident highlighted deficiency in the pre-embarkation security checks and in-flight security measures. In response, India moved to gradually inducting a single force, CISF for access control and security screening of passengers and hand baggage, mandatory secondary ladder point checking at certain airports, in-flight security officers (IFSOs or Air Marshals) and a security fee to be levied on passengers. 

On December 4, 2000, a Sabena Airbus flight, while approaching Bubjumbura airport, Burundi, was shot at by machine gun fire injuring two passengers and damaging the plane. This brought into focus the importance of funnel area guarding. In many countries, this area is at least kept under surveillance by the security forces. 

On July 24, 2001, six suicide bombers of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) carried out an attack on Colombo airport and destroyed several empty aircrafts. The incident resulted in loss of aircrafts costing USD 450 million, slowdown of the Sri Lankan economy and drop in tourism. This incident led to QRTs being deployed at major airports in many countries which also deployed barriers on the approach road for checking and deterrence. 

All the above incidents and the security responses were mere chicken feed compared to what happened on September 11, 2001, commonly known as 9/11. That calls for another blog.