BCAS, Who?

 

BCAS, Who? That was the question many of my friends and colleagues asked me when I told them I was going to join BCAS. The full form is Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, an attached office under Ministry of Civil Aviation to regulate the security of civil aviation in India.

Recently, the organisation commemorated its 37th Raising Day. The occasion led me to ponder over what BCAS has done over its long existence and whether it has led to securing air travel better. I have been amazed about two things. For all its low profile, much earlier than 9/11, it had put into place a lot of systems which the world woke up to only after 9/11. Second, India was and still is fairly behind the curve in terms of technology but the BCAS systems were achieving the outcomes pretty well in the absence of the fancy technology.

Much like the rest of the world, in India also, security was as varied and variable from airport to airport as there were opinions and relative importance given to it. Each airport had a different access control system, manned by personnel largely drawn from the local police. The composition of the force did not follow any set pattern and seemed more dependent on whims and fancies of senior officers and exigencies. For example, when I was Superintendent of Police, Calcutta Airport in 1995, I was intrigued to find that the domestic airport security was manned by local police, the international airport was manned by CRPF, the perimeter was guarded by Eastern Frontier Rifles and the immigration was manned by Calcutta Police although the airport was not even in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police.

I asked the airport Director why Calcutta Police was manning the immigration when it was not in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police. He told me that one evening he was chatting with the state Home Secretary and casually mentioned that the khaki uniform looked a little soiled and could there be a different colour like white. Overnight, the West Bengal Police personnel were replaced by those from Calcutta Police just because their uniform was white. The airport Director of course did not know the intricacies of Police jurisdiction, legal problems, problems arising out of multiplicity of force (i.e., lack of accountability, cross-purpose working), etc.. Point is, with multiple forces and multiple systems at each of the airports, no airport remains safe even if the forces and systems are top class. A compromise in the security architecture in one airport affects the whole aviation security in the country because the planes fly from and to airports. If a weapon or an explosive device or a terrorist gets into the system at one airport, it or he has access to restricted areas of pretty much all of the aviation sector. The decision to have one force for all the airports in the country was taken before 9/11 happened. Hence we see CISF, its airport security group specialising in aviation security, at most airports. The process is not complete yet but we are slowly getting there.

Long, long back, when I boarded a plane for the first time, in Guwahati, I was concerned when I had to part with my registered baggage. What if someone made off with it? I would be landing in Calcutta without even a toothbrush ... However, trusting fate and providence, I got into the plane with a heavy heart, struggled with the seat belt for a while and then settled down. Suddenly, there was an announcement for me to get down and I panicked. Neatly laid out on the tarmac was my battered but beloved suitcase. The airline guy informed that all the other bags were loaded but mine was not because I had not identified it as mine. I simply did not know the requirement. The idea was, mostly, terrorists do not themselves want to die. If the bag travelled with him, it was less likely to contain material for interference in civil aviation. India had it then. Baggage identification and reconciliation became the norm in much of the world much later.

Till date, many countries in the world still have not managed to put in place a system whereby 100 % screening of persons and cargo entering the secure part of the aviation system has been achieved. BCAS mandated it and achieved it long ago.

The above are just two examples. Many other systems which have been in place in India cannot be discussed here due to security considerations.

Technology is good but can we achieve the same outcomes without it?

Perimeter intrusion detection system was the buzzword a while ago. India also acquired it but in a limited way. Till date, the technology has not proved a good enough substitute for the human pair of eyes from a watch tower introduced by BCAS long ago.

Much was written about the stupidity of the jawan putting a stamp on the hand baggage tag when passengers were being screened. “Silly bits of paper with an elastic attached” is how Chetan Bhagat described the baggage tags in his article, “India – stupid, India – smart” in the Times of India. He went on to describe how a really smart terrorist can dodge the system by hiding an unstamped bag in a bigger, stamped bag, and so on. Fact is, no security system is foolproof – layers of security always need to be piled on top of each other to reduce the possibility of a threat passing through. That is why one is sometimes checked at the main entrance, compulsorily at the screening point, and many times, again before the boarding. Then, what about the jawan himself? Does he come from some exotic planet where everything is unsullied and pure as the driven snow? No, he comes from the same place you and I come from – our diverse society with its follies and foibles and large parts of it militancy infested and small parts of it radicalised. He also has his family and loved ones who can be compromised or put under threat. If the jawan is compromised, no system will be able to check the depredations. The terrorist does not even have to be smart. That stamp used to have certain secret features which identified the screener and made him accountable and less susceptible to compromise. In a hijacking situation, at Amritsar involving Indian Airlines flight IC 427, there was armed intervention by the security forces and a terrorist was killed. From the stamp on his boarding card, the screener who had let in two pistols with him was identified and apprehended. Was the stamping system stupid? No, I think, it was pretty smart actually. And, it cost very little, way less than all those fancy CCTV cameras and so on  whose efficacy for detecting a mischievous act by the screener is doubtful, at best.

Well, I resisted all the pressures to do away with the system, even incurring the wrath of the Minister. However, after I left the organisation, the system has been stopped. I doubt if anyone benefited from it. Meanwhile, the aviation security architecture is one layer less.