Lies, damned lies II

In an earlier blog (https://b-b-dash.blogspot.com/2022/09/lies-damned-lies.html), I held forth on how cops are relying on statistics just like a drunken man relies on a lamp post, for support rather than illumination. In one of the responses, someone asked me what should be done then. Since the answer would’ve been a little involved, long-winded and possibly extremely boring, I desisted. Recently, during the event for launching of my book (Police in Blunderland) in Kolkata, the question cropped up again when the moderator asked me what the policy makers should do. I answered briefly that they should do away with the existing statistics and, instead, stick to two measures. Here’s the full answer which I couldn’t give in a Q & A session. 

The problem has been that the Police and the public have not been working together. It’s desirable that they should and we should measure whether they are working together. Let’s surmise how. 

Suppose we don’t bother about how many murders are committed this year vis-à-vis last year. Murders need to go up because the population is going up, propensity and rewards of crime are going up, while police/ population ratio is either static or going down. Any statistic to the contrary is a chimera. So, let’s see if we’re getting together with the public to improve the crime situation. Let’s change the statistical game and measure one statistic, no. of citizen-assisted arrests as a proportion of total arrests at each Police Station/ District/ State/ Country. That will help us figure out whether the public is with us or against us and whether we are working with the public or not. 

How does that help? Let’s take a terrorist event. The event is a culmination of at least seven preceding processes that the terrorist himself undertakes, (i) recce, (ii) elicitation, (iii) testing security, (iv) acquiring supplies, (v) suspicious persons who do not belong, (vi) dry runs and (vii) developing assets. If citizens have a good working relationship with the police, each of these signs will be noticed and reported. On the other hand, if an adversarial role exists between the police and the citizenry, it will always be “not my problem, who wants the hassle?” For police to gather the information, it entails enormous costs in terms of manpower deployment, surveillance, interception through very expensive equipment and so on whereas the information is available to the citizenry practically free of cost. For policing to be effective and cost efficient, it needs to be “co-produced” because citizens have more information at lesser cost than the police. 

Will it make a difference to the crime situation? It will, if we measure the crime situation correctly. The crime situation is not the number of murders or dacoity or theft or so on. It is something called the “cost of crime.” Now, what strange animal is this? 

The cost of crime is the sum total of Victim Costs + Avoidance Costs  + Community Costs + Residual Fear + Criminal Justice Costs + Offender Costs. 

The victim costs include tangible losses like property loss, value of lives lost, medical costs, burial/ cremation costs, mental health care costs, wage and productivity loss, legal costs, household service loss, school days loss and intangible losses like pain and suffering. Avoidance costs are the costs of the precautions potential victims take to avoid the crime, e.g., burglar alarm system, CCTV cameras, shifting residence to less crime-prone or gated community, etc.. Community costs include costs of hotlines, public announcements, neighbourhood watch schemes, etc.. Residual fear pertains both to victims and potential victims and persists long after a crime is committed. Criminal justice costs include police and investigative costs, costs pertaining to prosecution (courts, lawyers, witnesses’ time, victim’s time in court) and costs of prison facility, etc.. For the period the offender is incarcerated, he is not economically productive so there is an offender cost in terms of lost productivity and so on. 

All this sounds quite a handful but, actually, these costs are already being calculated in some countries, and quite effectively too. India, with its serious intellectual and IT capability will be quickly up to the task if only there is the will. Once a software is in place, it can easily feed off the details from the FIR and other documents already available digitally. If this total cost of crime per capita or per policeman comes down, that would be a definitive achievement. 

In these columns, I have been pressing for online registration of FIRs for all crimes, including for false complaints. Certain categories of cases are now possible to be registered online in certain jurisdictions but things haven’t progressed much. We fear false cases too much. Robust prosecution for false cases will bring that problem down. This is an issue I propose to elaborate upon later.

Poking and prying around AVSEC II

Whenever any policy maker wants to improve the passenger experience at Indian airports, he obsesses on the waiting times in queues. As such, there is a lot of pressure on BCAS and the security agencies to reduce that waiting time, even at the cost of screening thoroughness. This is a serious, undesirable trade-off.  Also, most stakeholders (in those 100-odd meetings, remember?) emphasise that the passengers are put off by too much of uniform and an intrusive security presence. What my research threw up was at serious odds with this. 

It is true that a larger number of passengers felt that the waiting times at various security related queues were longer than expected. However, the passenger’s irritation about these is far outweighed by his positive feelings about the favourable aspects of Indian aviation security like our security equipment, procedures, security staff quality, their professionalism, the optics, security-related information flow, threat perception and so on. Further, rather than being irritated by it, the Indian passenger is actually happier and feels safer with higher presence of uniformed personnel around. One of the reasons for this is that he feels that the threat to the nation’s security and its aviation is extremely high.

Waiting time related irritation does not impact the passenger’s satisfaction with aviation security or the passenger’s willingness to participate in the security process or his willingness to pay the security fee; It also has no backward linkages in that no other input factor influences it. Hence, the current obsession of stake holders on reducing security-related waiting times even at the cost of security thoroughness needs to stop.

We must give greater attention to the need of the female passengers who are rating all the aviation security factors lower than their male counterparts. One possible reason could be privacy concerns around screening, their hand baggage and intimate items being scanned by male staff, requirement to remove mangalsutra (auspicious necklace worn by married women) and so on. Another reason may be a male-dominated security staffing. The cause should be further examined and the issue addressed, possibly through more no-contact screening like body scanner, greater female staffing, especially access control and guidance, and segregated handbag screening and threat resolution by female staff. Passengers of international flights tend to rate the security factors less favourably. While there is no variation in perception based on type of residence (urban, rural, etc.), region (north, south, etc.), frequency of flying and age, there is significant variation by education level and income of the passenger. In the communication strategies and interaction, it may be worthwhile to veer away from the current one-size-fits-all approach and adopt a segmented offering. The positive feelings about the aviation security factors are high while the passenger is at the airport and tend to wane after he goes off-airport. To have an engaged passenger, a certain amount of promotion (at least informational) of the security efforts is called for.

The three factors that together go on to create a passenger highly satisfied with aviation security are security staff quality, security equipment and procedures and optics and directions, in that order. In staff quality, the perceived training level at the passenger screening point is the most important. Rather than equipment, the screening procedure of passenger screening is important to the passenger, e.g., fairness in selection of passenger for enhanced screening, satisfactory grievance resolution, etc.. Under optics and directions, security-related guidance by the staff is of critical importance.

Whenever there is any new or fancy security gadget anywhere in the world, the security agencies involved in aviation demand it for India. I confess, I’ve also been part of this when I headed BCAS. As a result, India has some of the best technology in aviation security, e.g., Perimeter Intrusion Detection System, Body scanners, 3-D baggage scanners, Pan-Tilt-Zoom (PTZ) cameras, advanced explosives detection systems, robotic handling devices for suspicious bags and controlled explosions and so on; however, the study showed that there is no substitute for the human factor for creating a passenger happy with the aviation security. When one examines each of the composite factors going into making for a satisfied passenger, the most critical sub-factor is the human-related one. Thus, under security staff, training perception of the security staff at the passenger screening checkpoint is the critical element. Under security procedures, it is the passenger screening; under optics, it is the security guidance by staff (rather than all those fancy SMS and WhatsApp); under security information, explain-speak by staff; under security fee, transparent usage of it; and, under security participation, assisting the security staff. Thus, the human element has stood out as important throughout the various stages of the research. Since there is a trade-off between investing in machines versus investing in humans, if passenger satisfaction be the goal, a greater emphasis on the latter is clearly indicated.

 

Why should we aim to have a passenger who is happy with aviation security? The passenger has to go through it whether he likes it or not. What difference does it make whether he likes it or is extremely irritated by it? Let’s look a little closer. Mandated or not, security is also a service like other service components of air travel like timeliness, comfort, etc.. Believe it or not, “safety and security” is THE most important component of service quality for a passenger in air travel. Study after study confirms this beyond doubt. Service is not like a physical product. It is co-created by the customer. A passenger buying in to security makes for a qualitatively better and more robust security and better throughput because it cuts down the negotiation time between passenger and security personnel and also reduces screening time as the passenger is more co-operative. This, apart from generating valuable intelligence and information for the security personnel.

 

What is also a little less obvious is that even though it’s a mandated service, aviation security does operate in a competitive environment. As the road and rail transport get speedier and smoother and air travel becomes more affordable and accessible to the lower rungs of society because of the ambitious UDAN scheme (Ude Desh ke Aam Naagrik), air travel competes increasingly with other modes of transport. The cost of security in terms of the aviation security fee and inconvenience of waiting times and security processes comes into play in enplanement decisions. The security service providers themselves compete with each other. There has been a lot of lobbying to replace CISF which is perceived as costly even though the DG, BCAS sleeps a whole lot better in the night because CISF is in charge at most of the airports. The passenger also exercises a choice in terms of the price he pays for security by his opinions and perceptions articulated through the public representatives – that is why aviation security fee has been very difficult to revise upwards. A passenger happier with the security will be more willing to pay a higher fee.

 

The passenger is telling us a few things loud and clear. Are we prepared to listen?

Poking and prying around AVSEC

  

This week, something funny happened. I was awarded a PhD by IIT, Delhi, at the sprightly young age of 63!

 

During my tenure at Bureau of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), I must have attended more than a hundred meetings pertaining to matters security. Most of these meetings were marked by heated arguments and counter-arguments about the security apparatus, the need for some of the measures and equipment, the costs, who should pay, etc.. Usually, it’s either BCAS as Veer Abhimanyu ranged against pouncing stake holders bothered about their bottom lines or the security agencies vis-à-vis the rest and the twain never meet. In all this, I found that somehow people have forgotten to ask the critical guy, the passenger, as to what he feels about it all. Even though, in the debates, each one professes to be standing up for what is good for the passenger. So, for my Ph D research, I decided to go to the passenger and ask him/ her. I collected a large number of responses and let the data take me where they would.

 

While some of the findings were along expected lines, some things took me by surprise. Given another go at heading BCAS, I’d do quite a few things differently.

 

I have earlier mentioned in these columns that India is doing extremely well in aviation security, as evidenced by the ICAO audit results. Well, India is not only doing well, it is seen by the passenger to be doing well too. Passengers rate different aspects of the Indian aviation security efforts very high. More importantly, their desire to participate in the security process outweighs even these high ratings. This gives the lie to the attitude of the security agencies that the average passenger needs to be reined in and will violate security regulations unless compelled to comply. So far, we haven’t co-opted the passenger in the security process. Given another stint at BCAS, I’d change that. Nothing much required, really. Just ask him what he feels about things, what he would like changed, open dialogues with the many passenger associations, association of persons with disability, passengers with special needs like autism, engage them under supervision for evacuation, escorting, etc. during bomb threat drills, even train them for assisting and do’s and don’ts during a hijack or other security incidents.

 

When I was in BCAS, it was mandated that at least 15 % of the hand baggage needed to be opened for manual checking. The security agencies were finding it difficult to meet that quota. However, a full 37 % of the passengers surveyed during my research now indicated that they were asked to open their hand baggage. This was a little unexpected. What was expected and hasn’t changed from my time is that a full 79 % of the passengers were not aware that they were paying an aviation security fee. Another 14 %, while being aware of it, did not know the amount. This is the fee charged on the ticket when you book. These do not indicate a happy state of affairs and the reasons are historical attitudes of which I myself have been guilty too.

 

The security providers and the security recipients are operating in silos, in adversarial lock-step. Although the passenger is paying, he is not told what or why he is paying. Actually, there is always apprehension in the minds of the policy makers that the passenger would react adversely to paying for security. Further, that he would be furious about any increase in the same. On the contrary, the survey indicated that the passengers who know about it are very favourable towards the security fee, feel that it is not only justified but also it would be used transparently. They are also in favour of paying more and would be happy with differential pricing based on class of ticket, airport size, threat categorization of airport and so on. Although this may make it more complicated, it may be worth a pilot trial, especially because many of the airports complain that the fees collected fall short of security payouts that they have to bear.

 

A service provider focused approach (as opposed to a customer-centric approach) can have counter-productive consequences. For example, the Hold Baggage System (HBS). These are the centralized baggage scanning systems you find in the bigger airports. In the smaller airports, you hand over your registered checked-in baggage to an airline guy manning his airline’s X-ray machine. So, you’ve to run around finding out where your particular airline has set up shop, go there yourself, put the bag into the machine. After it is cleared, the airline guy puts some sticker or strap on it to prevent tampering, then you carry it yourself to the airline check-in counter which need not be close to that airline’s X-ray machine, hand it in, the check-in person verifies the seal/ strap and then starts the check-in process. On the other hand, under the HBS, you just hand it in at the check-in counter for an integrated check-in and baggage screening, regardless of the airline. This was expected to improve the passenger experience and reduce his inconveniences. However, the survey threw up the result that the passengers are associating this system with longer waiting times and are getting irritated by it. Either the added waiting times at the check-in counter is outweighing the convenience or the perception needs to be acted upon. HBS is extremely expensive and if it doesn’t lead to higher passenger satisfaction, something is not right. There is also the added matter of HBS improving the security because individual airlines may have differing screening standards and security is as strong as its weakest link. Why not tell the passenger?

 

[To be concluded]

Tall people and their mango tales II

 

When I was a lowly DIG, supervision of a training centre was part of my remit. Whenever a new course was started at the training centre, I would put up a note on a file seeking instruction as to which dignitary could spare time to inaugurate the same. The file moves upward, through the IG, then ADG to DG. On one occasion, the DG begged off as he had other commitments. So did the ADG as he was going to be out of station. The IG wrote that he would inaugurate. That should have completed the matter. However, the IG’s PA brought the file personally back to me. He said that what was written was only part of the story; the IG also desired that I should go to his house to personally escort him to the training centre. This was unusual. I checked with my organisation and other organisations and there was no such practice anywhere. So I went to the IG and suggested that I’d receive him at the training centre and he agreed. 

The next morning, a Saturday, I received a call from the Commandant of the training centre. He told me that IG sahab had asked him to convey that he desired me to escort him from his house. Actually, if he had invited me to his house, I’d probably have gone happily. What he was trying was to humiliate me in the eyes of subordinates showing how superior he was and how I was less than dust beneath his chariot wheels. However, I politely told the Commandant that I’d talked to the IG and he’d agreed that I should receive him at the training centre. A few minutes later, I received another call from the Commandant reiterating the “instructions.” I was now het up and told him that “no force on earth can compel me to do that little thing” and he must convey these exact words to the IG and “report compliance.” On the appointed day, I landed up at the training centre in time, waited for the IG who kept waiting for me at his house and left after the due hour was past. The IG fretted and fumed and finally went sputtering to the training centre alone to formally inaugurate. For such and other persistent conduct and, on the complaints of a large number of officers, his career went into a tailspin, never to recover again.

 

One of my DGs once hosted a farewell party for his batchmate, another DG. Just before the party started, he called me and passed an important instruction – the band should play the theme song of “Eyes of Laura Mars” exactly when he would hand over the memento to the outgoing officer. Luckily, I didn’t take any chances and called the bandmaster to receive the instruction directly from him. The bandmaster politely nodded and walked off. The moment came for the final speeches and the handing over of the memento. The band burst forth into a beautiful rendition of “Laal dupatta mal mal ka …” The DG was furious and summoned me to vent his anger. I politely reminded him that he had directly instructed the bandmaster who was now summoned in turn and the DG let loose upon him. To which, the bandmaster sheepishly replied, “Kya karen sahab, ek hi tune practice kiye the …” [We can play any tune provided it’s Laal dupatta mal mal ka …]

 

When I was in BCAS, I once received a call from an IG in a state. His request for a pass to the tarmac of Delhi airport had been turned down. He had done all the research regarding my batchmates in the IPS and contacted some of them to persuade me and had drawn a blank because each of them had told him that I was too pig-headed. He tried to contact the Secretary in the Ministry and learnt that I had filed a case against the Secretary. In his desperation, he had checked my entire academic journey and found that he had gone to the same school which I attended from 3^rd standard to 5^th standard. He used that as the conversation opener.

 

Why he went to all this trouble was that his CM was arriving by a special flight and he wanted to receive him at the tarmac. I told him that any kind of reception or send-off is not permitted on the tarmac. He begged and pleaded but I couldn’t accommodate him. Finally, he said that when the CM got down from the plane, if he is not there with a flower bouquet, his job will be gone. Be that as it may, I didn’t give him the Airport Entry Permit and do not know what happened to him. His concern and desperation were genuine.

 

Whenever the same CM used to travel by air, all the Ministers in the state cabinet used to land up at the airport to see him off. Since reception and send-off were not permitted in the airport, this used to cause a lot of chaos. Finally, the CISF in-charge at the airport devised a formula. He would draw a circle in chalk just outside the airport entry gate and all the Ministers would stand inside that circle. What he found was that the Ministers would land up and stand inside that circle with heads bowed and the CM’s cavalcade would zoom past. In exasperation, he asked one of the Ministers what was the point of standing there with heads bowed when there was no greeting; even the CM wouldn’t even notice them individually. One of the Ministers enlightened him, “He’d later check the video footage and from their facial expression, he’d determine who was how loyal.”

 

Why people do these things is beyond me. Oonche log aur unke aam baaten. Tall people and their mango tales! Or, the higher a monkey climbs, the more you see of its bottom.

Tall people and their mango tales

A former CM used to take one week off in a year to rest and recuperate. When I was SDPO, he chose a forest resort in my sub division to do so. When the CM comes visiting, the big dignitaries in the district become small dignitaries. Thus, the DM becomes the usher boy, the SP becomes the darwan, the DFO becomes the forest guide and so on. SDOs and SDPOs are reduced to being mere errand boys. During that time, the government at the centre which was supported by the party in power in West Bengal was about to collapse and the Prime Minister tried to speak to the Chief Minister. However, in those pre-cellphone, trunk call days, the connections could not get established. That was a crisis of epic proportions. The Divisional Commissioner was furious and rushed off to “wake up those monkeys at the telephone exchange,” as he put it. In my capacity as errand boy-cum-announcer, I accompanied him so that I could precede him and announce his arrival in hushed but important, sibilant tones to the telephone guys. When we reached the exchange, we found exactly one guy nodding off on his table. I duly announced. As he was slowly coming to life, the Commissioner started a barrage of abuses. He raved and ranted for almost ten minutes. At the end of which, the guy just said, “Hobe na,” meaning, no can do. Those two bored words put an abrupt full stop to all that sound and fury of the preceding hour. I guess, the government at the Centre would still have collapsed even if the PM and CM had connected on phone that day. 

The next morning, I found that the pilot of the helicopter by which the CM had travelled had taken seriously ill due to suspected food poisoning. Since no one else in the entourage had any problem, I investigated the matter a little further. What happened was, this particular pilot used to think of himself as no less than the CM. He came strutting around and demanded all kinds of luxuries including the choicest booze. By the evening, most of the guys were thoroughly pissed off with his demands. I was told that a Dy SP took an empty Black Label bottle, filled it with the local brew, Changta and palmed it off as the real thing. Even strong men with zinc-lined stomachs shudder at the thought of having Changta but the poor pilot was taken in. The rest was history – or, at least, complete bed rest for a few days. Luckily, he recovered before the CM was due back.

 

Subsequent to that infamous price rise leading to the fall of Delhi government in 1998, in West Bengal, there were daily meetings chaired by a senior Minister. As DCP, I used to accompany CP, Calcutta to these meetings. One day, the honourable Minister said, “Look, West Bengal accounts for the highest potato production in the country. The people here will forgive us anything else but won’t tolerate an increase in the potato price. Let’s stop export of potato to other states for the time being.” Accordingly, we stopped all the outbound trucks transporting potato to other states. The next day, there was an emergency meeting in the Minister’s chamber. Apparently, in response to the potato ban, the Andhra CM had given a press statement that fish export from Andhra to West Bengal would be stopped. Andhra accounted for a huge percentage of the fish consumed here (70 %, I was told). This was apocalypse! So, exports to Andhra were reluctantly allowed, under duress, and all of us were tasked to report the price of different types of fish in each market on a daily basis.

 

In my cadre, there is a system of calling on the senior officers when one joins a new assignment. The system was corrupted so much that in the district where I joined as SP, there was also a system of calling on the DCS, the local big leader of the ruling party. When told about it, I was a little revolted. For me, my senior officers were mai baap, real mothers and fathers. Given that, I didn’t want to acquire excess luggage like step-mothers and step-fathers in the form of politicians so I didn’t bother about the calling on bit. After waiting for the courtesy call, the DCS must’ve become furious. When I went to Calcutta after a week for the calling on with the senior officers, my first port of call was the Home Secretary. After the pleasantries, he asked me what I’d done to enrage the DCS who had gone complaining about me to all and sundry. I said how was that possible as I was only one week into the assignment. Then he burst out laughing. He said, “No, the guy was complaining that your English was weak. When I asked him why, he said, shuddu ektai word jaane, NO [the only word you know is NO]. Whatever his party members were asking, e.g., don’t arrest our supporters, arrest the other side in cooked-up cases, inform us before starting a case and so on, you’re just saying NO.”

 

The District Magistrate and SP behave like lords in the districts. As SP of the district, I used to be invited for some parties. I attended very few of them but used to land up at the appointed time, to the consternation of all. I found that, actually, there are people designated in the DM and SP’s retinue who ring up to find out whether the other guests had arrived and only after that was so, the laat sahebs (DM and SP) would make an appearance. Sounds silly? Actually, we can be very silly.

 

Oonche log aur unki aam baaten. Tall people and their mango tales. 

 

[To be continued]

S & M

 

My brother lost an almost brand new bicycle. It had six gears – the big thing then. It was stolen when he was tutoring a kid for some pocket money. We went down to the nearby police station to lodge an FIR. We waited and waited near the Duty Officer’s desk for about three hours before we were attended to. The Duty Officer was a young guy, very pleasant. He told us ki stationery nahin hai, humein hi lana padega. My brother went out and got back with a few sheets of white paper after about an hour because there was no stationery shop nearby. The Duty Officer laughed. He said minimum one ream was required – how did we think police stations ran! Another one round, another one hour. This time, with a bond of one ream of paper forged between us, he decided to be frank. Chhota case hei, lekin sau rupaiya toh lagega. I had just joined the service and did not know the ways of the world. I bristled and told him I was an IPS probationer. He apologised and said, “Saab, aap IPS hain toh pachaas rupaiya mein ho jaayega.” 

This is a true story.

 

After thirty odd years in the job, I ask myself, has anything changed? Yes. We have big and great management experts at the top “doing” digital policing, sensitisation, proactive, community policing, CCTNS (that never–ending policing digitisation initiative) and so on. On the ground – will a police station be my first port of call if I am in distress? Not at all. It will pretty much be the last on the list.

 

Why should this be so? The default option for police is not crime investigation. The default option is S&M. No, it’s not Sadism/ Masochism – it’s the two most revered words in the police lexicon that outsiders never hear about: Suppression and Minimisation. This is possibly the best kept secret of the force since early British days. What are they, exactly?

 

Like most police officers in a supervisory capacity, my days as a zonal Additional Superintendent of Police used to begin with a perusal of the daily Situation Report (sitrep) delivered at my house at six A. M.. It contained all the cases registered during the previous 24 hours in various police stations under my watch. The first column contained the Special Report (SR) cases. These were cases pertaining to heinous crimes like murder, dacoity, etc which merited close supervision of the senior officers and which could be “closed” only with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of the range. One morning, I checked through the sitrep and found no SR case and breathed easy. Later in the morning someone informed me that in one of the police stations under my watch there was a brutal dacoity with murder the previous night. As far as crimes went, this was the top of the tree, ranking the highest in SR cases, way above anything else but the sitrep was clean as a whistle. I went down to the concerned police station to investigate my investigators.

 

No SR case was registered in the previous 24 hours. So I opted to go through all the cases. The only case was a minor one of someone trying to misappropriate some abandoned property. On closer examination, I found that the property was stolen from a dead body. A minor case, still. What about the body? There was no case because it was filed under “Unnatural Death,” the same as when someone drowns or is bitten by a snake. So, a brutal dacoity when the inmate was murdered was reduced to an unnatural death and misappropriation of abandoned property. The figures look good on the floor of the Parliament and the state Assembly. They look good when the SP or the Additional SP reports to his superiors. Do they look good to the family of the victim? Do they look good to their neighbours? Do they look good to the society at large? This is the second part – Minimisation.

 

The first part – Suppression – is something else. This is when nothing happens. This is where art and human ingenuity meet IPC and Cr PC (Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, respectively). Throughout my career as an underling, as a supervisory officer and as that all powerful figure called SP and DCP, I found that crime is what the SP/ DCP deems it to be. Unlike in other services, cops do not hold too many meetings. There is a monthly Crime Conference by the SP/ DCP where he declares what his objectives and guidelines for the force are. If he decides that dacoities should not exceed 10 in a particular month, the number of dacoity cases across police stations under his watch for that month stop at 9.99 or whatever but do not exceed or equal 10.

 

A citizen is “entitled” to register a case under proper section/s of law. Must this “nudge, nudge, wink, wink” regime continue? What will happen if one DGP in one state will one day wake up and say, no – henceforth, all complaints will be registered under the proper section of law? It happened in West Bengal – possibly under judicial duress, in Jalpaiguri district because of judicial wrangles regarding siting of a High Court and was called the Jalpaiguri experiment. But why be forced? Why not be proactive in this regard?

Mad Monkey III: Smoke and mirrors

 

On December 22, 2001, a British terrorist, Richard Reid boarded American airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami wearing special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms. He tried unsuccessfully to detonate the same but was overpowered by the other passengers and flight crew. After this incident (referred to as the ‘shoe-bomber incident’), the shoes came in for special screening by security staff all over the world and many countries require shoes to be taken off at the screening checkpoint. 

On September 13, 2005, a wheelchair-bound passenger, Porfirio Ramirez and his son hijacked a Colombian airliner after boarding the same at Florencia for Bogota. The weapons used were two live grenades hidden in Porforio’s diapers. After this incident, screening of sick/ wheelchair-bound passengers became more stringent; the wheelchairs were screened separately and particular attention was paid to plaster cast, prosthetics, etc.. This has created a lot of furore from genuine passengers with ailment or disability and has raised concerns about privacy issues and dignity.

 

After an extensive surveillance operation in 2006, the British Police uncovered a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board aircrafts flying from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The explosives were to be disguised as soft drinks. At least seven flights were targeted by 18 suicide bombers and several associates. 24 persons were arrested in this connection in and around London on August 9, 2006. Seven of the accused persons have been convicted. This incident was followed by severe restrictions on carrying of liquids in hand baggage by several countries. Gradually, the restrictions have been relaxed and passengers are allowed to carry 100 ml containers of liquid, aerosol and gels (LAGs) up to a maximum of one litre. Liquids of higher quantity purchased in the SHA can be carried on board only if they are packed in Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs) by the retailer and checked at the aircraft gate. 

On June 30, 2007, a jeep loaded with propane canisters was driven at the glass doors of Glasgow airport terminal by two terrorists and set on fire, causing injury to several passengers. This incident brought to the fore the possibilities of landside attacks and has led to fixed and hydraulic bollards at the entrance to airport terminals, check posts and barriers on the approach road to the airports and permanent obstructions in front of the terminals to obstruct motor vehicles. 

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian terrorist travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Northwest flight 253, attempted to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear by injecting acid into it through a syringe to cause a chemical reaction. He succeeded in causing a fire and a small explosion but was overpowered by fellow passengers. Hitherto, all screening was geared towards detecting metal because it was presumed that detonation could not take place without involvement of metallic device for the charging. However, this incident showed possibilities of triggering explosions without using metal. This led to more emphasis on pat-down search and also reinforced the restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels. 

On October 29, 2010, two packages, each containing plastic explosives hidden inside printer cartridges and a detonating mechanism were discovered on cargo planes in flights from Yemen to the United States at en route stopovers in UK and Dubai. The bombs were primed to be activated by a cell phone alarm shortly before the planes landed. Prior to this incident, security around cargo and cargo planes was lax. However, this cargo could have been trans-shipped through passenger planes also and any contamination of cargo would compromise the security architecture of the entire aviation system. This led the policy makers to tighten cargo security. Cargo was mandated to go through 100 % screening. The distinction between passenger and all-cargo aircrafts for security purposes was abolished. In India, there has been creation of cargo SHA, armed guarding of main entry and exit to cargo complexes and continuous CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) and manual surveillance of airside and Security Restricted Area (SRA) as well as city side proximate areas including car parking area. 

On January 24, 2011, a suicide bomber carried out an attack at the baggage claim area of the international arrival hall of Moscow’s Domodedovo airport killing 37 and injuring 173. India already had entry restrictions into the arrival and departure areas. After this incident, in India, ID proof was made mandatory for even visitors with entry tickets. Many airports around the world started screening and restricting entry into all areas of the airports including areas which were unrestricted earlier. 

On March 8, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared after losing contact 38 minutes after take-off. The aircraft has not been traced and the 227 passengers and 12 crew aboard are all presumed dead. The security response has included mandates for increased battery life on underwater locator beacons, lengthening of recording times on flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, and new standards for aircraft position reporting over the open ocean. 

On March 24, 2015, Germanwings flight 9525 from Barcelona to Dusseldorf was deliberately crashed by the co-pilot while the captain was out of the cockpit, killing all the 144 passengers and six crew members. This led to regulations requiring the presence of two authorised persons in the cockpit at all times and also tightening of measures against insider threat, e.g., security vetting of all staff, 100 % screening of all staff and their baggage before entering Security Restricted Area, etc.. 

These then are the genesis of all the inconveniences one faces while travelling by air. Even so, aviation security remains smoke-and-mirrors. Actually, when good guys try to imagine bad things, they are not very good at it. Like we do our research and development, the terrorists also carry out their own R&D to find newer ways to breach the defences. Plus, they need to be lucky just once, the security guys, every single time; thus, the probabilities favour the other side. A well-informed terrorist knows that there are thousands of loopholes and building a dyke to bulwark it all would bring air travel to a standstill. So, somewhere between bluster and business, between theatre and substance, we, the security guys chug along. Literally on a wing and a prayer.

Mad Monkey II: The game changer

 

The turning point in aviation security (AVSEC) came on September 11, 2001, commonly referred to as 9/11 when four commercial aircrafts which took off from three different airports in the United States were hijacked mid-air by 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists in a coordinated attack; two of the aeroplanes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York both of which collapsed, one aeroplane crashed into the west side of the Pentagon, the headquarters of U.S. military and one aeroplane targeting either the White House or the Capitol Building crashed in a field as the passengers fought the hijackers. The death toll is estimated at around 3,000 and almost 6,000 persons have been estimated to have been injured in the incidents. This was the first time that aircrafts were used as weapons, with devastating effect. Prior to this incident, there were widely variable standards of aviation security enforcement practised by different countries. Countries which were not much affected by terrorist incidents did not imbue civil aviation security with adequate seriousness. 9/11 changed all that. Worldwide, policy planners and governments woke up to the seriousness of the threats related to civil aviation security and to the realisation that no aviation operation is safe unless all aviation operation is safe from terrorist depredations. As a result, worldwide, AVSEC and screening procedures became more stringent and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) sought to initiate measures for closer monitoring. 

Several studies were undertaken to analyse the failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The Unites States set up a 9/11 Commission which submitted its final report in 2004. One Transport Security Administration study found that before 9/11, although there was registered baggage reconciliation with the passengers, only 5 % of the baggage was screened for explosives. According to an FAA evaluation at major airports in the United States, hand bag and passenger screeners missed approximately 20 % of potentially dangerous items.

After 9/11, many countries passed laws to make aviation security more robust and there have been growing “surveillance state” and “safety state.” Surveillance has involved monitoring of suspect persons and groups on a continuous basis and safety state is a regime of a broad range of policies which may include Advance Passenger Information (API), Passenger Name Record (PNR), watch lists, no-fly lists, etc. and coordinated plan for security. Post 9/11 period has seen enhanced front-end screening, increase in security staff hiring, shift of screening from private operators and outsourced agencies to governmental agencies, upgradation and integration of security technology, especially explosives detection systems and improvement of training practices and standards. These new measures included “social sorting” whereby certain groups of passengers were marked out for differential security screening treatment. Prior to 9/11, Germany’s asylum policies were liberal. Investigations revealed that some of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks had taken advantage of this and resided for some time in Germany. Post 9/11, German Parliament passed Air Security Act that contained a number of regulations for harsher security screening at airports and empowered the government to take military measures to deal with terrorism aboard an aircraft. Other new laws addressed effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement. Canada enacted Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. United Kingdom passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. New Zealand enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act, 2002. The United States created the Department of Homeland Security for coordination of all anti-terrorism efforts and enacted USA Patriot Act. The Act gave the government the authority to detain foreign terror suspects for a week before being charged. It also gave sweeping powers for monitoring telephone communications, email and internet use by terror suspects. The biggest change in the United States was the creation of Transport Security Administration which took over the screening of passengers and luggage from airports and private agencies and also exercised oversight on the entire gamut of AVSEC. All the registered baggage was screened for explosives through four methods: an Explosives Detection System (EDS), Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) machines, bomb-sniffing dogs and manual bag searches. As a result, EDS and ETD screen 90 % of the baggage. The remaining baggage was checked by bomb sniffing dogs and manual searches. There was massive increase in recruitment and training of screeners. Post 9/11, many countries assigned Air Marshals to flights. Bullet-proof cockpit doors with cameras were installed to alert the pilot/s of suspicious activities in the cabin. Countries like Sweden, Norway and Finland which had only a system of random security checks for domestic flights switched to 100 % screening. Some airports installed “dirty bomb” detectors.

Both the process and technology for screening of passengers, baggage and cargo have undergone major transformation. All passengers and crew are made to go through a sterile hold area (SHA) where they are admitted only after security screening of their person and hand baggage. In some countries, certain categories of persons, e.g., flight crew were exempted from screening. That has been sought to be stopped. The lists of another category of persons, VVIPs (Very Very Important Persons), who were earlier exempted from screening, have been pared down. The training standards of the screeners have been enhanced. Many countries have introduced body scanners and specialised detectors to “recognise” certain types of threats. Bigger airports have introduced in-line baggage screening HBS systems to screen registered baggage. Cargo screening agents have been brought under the regulatory and audit ambit of the security regulators of the country. Some countries have introduced a cargo SHA also.

Mad Monkey: Why oh why?

Why all this nonsense? All that I want to do is go from point A to point B. Fast. And, I’m paying for it. Why must I land up at the airport three hours early for a two-hour flight? Why should I stop my car so many times and get checked? Why so many checkings – on the road, at the gate, at the counter, at the interminable queues, at the aircraft? What is the thing about shoes? And my water bottle, and my shaving gel and my torchlight …? Who decides all these ridiculous things? And why? 

There is actually a reason all these things happen. Not all of it started in one go by some Mad Monkey Kung Fu who got up one day and said, “Hey, from today on, I’ll really put all air travellers to all possible types of torture!” 

On December 17, 1973, a Pan Am aircraft (flight 110) was attacked by PLO terrorists on the tarmac in Rome with weapons removed from hand luggage, killing 44 and destroying the aircraft. This led to pre-flight checks of aircrafts. In 1973, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the United States issued an emergency rule mandating screening of all passengers and hand baggage. Other countries followed the same in short order. 

Efforts to develop explosives detection equipment followed a bomb explosion through dynamite sticks placed in lockers at La Guardia airport in New York on December 29, 1975 near the Trans World Airlines (TWA) baggage reclaim terminal killing 11 people and seriously injuring 74 others. After this, FAA increased its efforts to develop the explosives detection capabilities and minimise the chances of “bombs in bags.”

On June 23, 1985, Air India flight 182 on Montreal-London-Delhi-Bombay route disintegrated mid-air over the Atlantic killing all 329 people aboard. This is considered “one of the worst (tragedies) in the aviation history.” In just an hour from then, another bomb on another Air India flight from Tokyo to Mumbai went off during luggage transfer at the Tokyo airport and killed two baggage handlers. These two were coordinated attacks through bombs in registered baggage which was unaccompanied. This incident led to stricter baggage screening, baggage identification and baggage reconciliation by the passengers. Unaccompanied baggage started getting discouraged or screened vigorously. 

On December 27, 1985, there were simultaneous attacks at airports in Rome and Vienna where El Al (Israeli airline) passengers were targeted in the check-in area of the airports. In the attacks, 19 civilians and four terrorists were killed and 140 civilians were injured. This incident led to armed guards being deployed in check-in areas. In India, armed personnel of the access control unit are deployed not only in the check-in area but also on the concourse foyer before entry into the terminal building. Some airports also have Quick Response Teams (QRTs) outside the airports. 

The 1980s witnessed increasing number of sabotage of civil aircrafts by terrorists. In 1985, there were 13 such acts killing 473 people. On December 21, 1988, a Boeing 747 aircraft of Pan Am airways flight PA 103 met with explosion over Scotland resulting in the death of all its 259 passengers and crew and 11 residents of Lockerbie. The destruction was caused by using SEMTEX, a high-performance plastic explosive. Thermal Neutron Activation (TNA) systems for detecting explosives were introduced in 1988. On December 19, 1987, FAA also required positive passenger bag matching for all international flights unless such unmatched bag had been physically searched. 

On December 24, 1994, Air France flight 8969 was hijacked at Algiers. Three passengers and all the four hijackers were killed in armed action at Marseille. The hijackers had gained access to the aircraft by dressing as policemen with Air Algerie logo. This incident highlighted the danger of “insider threat” and as a response, airport staff were mandated to be screened while entering restricted areas of the airport. Further, the background and antecedent checks of the employees were tightened. 

December 24, 1999 saw the last hijacking incident involving an Indian carrier when Indian Airlines flight IC-814 flying from Kathmandu (Nepal) to Delhi (India) was hijacked to Kandahar (Afghanistan) and the passengers held hostage were reportedly released in exchange for some convicted terrorists and a large amount of cash. In this case, enquiry revealed that weapons and ammunition were supplied to the terrorists in the tarmac area. This incident highlighted deficiency in the pre-embarkation security checks and in-flight security measures. In response, India moved to gradually inducting a single force, CISF for access control and security screening of passengers and hand baggage, mandatory secondary ladder point checking at certain airports, in-flight security officers (IFSOs or Air Marshals) and a security fee to be levied on passengers. 

On December 4, 2000, a Sabena Airbus flight, while approaching Bubjumbura airport, Burundi, was shot at by machine gun fire injuring two passengers and damaging the plane. This brought into focus the importance of funnel area guarding. In many countries, this area is at least kept under surveillance by the security forces. 

On July 24, 2001, six suicide bombers of LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) carried out an attack on Colombo airport and destroyed several empty aircrafts. The incident resulted in loss of aircrafts costing USD 450 million, slowdown of the Sri Lankan economy and drop in tourism. This incident led to QRTs being deployed at major airports in many countries which also deployed barriers on the approach road for checking and deterrence. 

All the above incidents and the security responses were mere chicken feed compared to what happened on September 11, 2001, commonly known as 9/11. That calls for another blog.

BCAS, Who?

 

BCAS, Who? That was the question many of my friends and colleagues asked me when I told them I was going to join BCAS. The full form is Bureau of Civil Aviation Security, an attached office under Ministry of Civil Aviation to regulate the security of civil aviation in India.

Recently, the organisation commemorated its 37th Raising Day. The occasion led me to ponder over what BCAS has done over its long existence and whether it has led to securing air travel better. I have been amazed about two things. For all its low profile, much earlier than 9/11, it had put into place a lot of systems which the world woke up to only after 9/11. Second, India was and still is fairly behind the curve in terms of technology but the BCAS systems were achieving the outcomes pretty well in the absence of the fancy technology.

Much like the rest of the world, in India also, security was as varied and variable from airport to airport as there were opinions and relative importance given to it. Each airport had a different access control system, manned by personnel largely drawn from the local police. The composition of the force did not follow any set pattern and seemed more dependent on whims and fancies of senior officers and exigencies. For example, when I was Superintendent of Police, Calcutta Airport in 1995, I was intrigued to find that the domestic airport security was manned by local police, the international airport was manned by CRPF, the perimeter was guarded by Eastern Frontier Rifles and the immigration was manned by Calcutta Police although the airport was not even in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police.

I asked the airport Director why Calcutta Police was manning the immigration when it was not in the jurisdiction of Calcutta Police. He told me that one evening he was chatting with the state Home Secretary and casually mentioned that the khaki uniform looked a little soiled and could there be a different colour like white. Overnight, the West Bengal Police personnel were replaced by those from Calcutta Police just because their uniform was white. The airport Director of course did not know the intricacies of Police jurisdiction, legal problems, problems arising out of multiplicity of force (i.e., lack of accountability, cross-purpose working), etc.. Point is, with multiple forces and multiple systems at each of the airports, no airport remains safe even if the forces and systems are top class. A compromise in the security architecture in one airport affects the whole aviation security in the country because the planes fly from and to airports. If a weapon or an explosive device or a terrorist gets into the system at one airport, it or he has access to restricted areas of pretty much all of the aviation sector. The decision to have one force for all the airports in the country was taken before 9/11 happened. Hence we see CISF, its airport security group specialising in aviation security, at most airports. The process is not complete yet but we are slowly getting there.

Long, long back, when I boarded a plane for the first time, in Guwahati, I was concerned when I had to part with my registered baggage. What if someone made off with it? I would be landing in Calcutta without even a toothbrush ... However, trusting fate and providence, I got into the plane with a heavy heart, struggled with the seat belt for a while and then settled down. Suddenly, there was an announcement for me to get down and I panicked. Neatly laid out on the tarmac was my battered but beloved suitcase. The airline guy informed that all the other bags were loaded but mine was not because I had not identified it as mine. I simply did not know the requirement. The idea was, mostly, terrorists do not themselves want to die. If the bag travelled with him, it was less likely to contain material for interference in civil aviation. India had it then. Baggage identification and reconciliation became the norm in much of the world much later.

Till date, many countries in the world still have not managed to put in place a system whereby 100 % screening of persons and cargo entering the secure part of the aviation system has been achieved. BCAS mandated it and achieved it long ago.

The above are just two examples. Many other systems which have been in place in India cannot be discussed here due to security considerations.

Technology is good but can we achieve the same outcomes without it?

Perimeter intrusion detection system was the buzzword a while ago. India also acquired it but in a limited way. Till date, the technology has not proved a good enough substitute for the human pair of eyes from a watch tower introduced by BCAS long ago.

Much was written about the stupidity of the jawan putting a stamp on the hand baggage tag when passengers were being screened. “Silly bits of paper with an elastic attached” is how Chetan Bhagat described the baggage tags in his article, “India – stupid, India – smart” in the Times of India. He went on to describe how a really smart terrorist can dodge the system by hiding an unstamped bag in a bigger, stamped bag, and so on. Fact is, no security system is foolproof – layers of security always need to be piled on top of each other to reduce the possibility of a threat passing through. That is why one is sometimes checked at the main entrance, compulsorily at the screening point, and many times, again before the boarding. Then, what about the jawan himself? Does he come from some exotic planet where everything is unsullied and pure as the driven snow? No, he comes from the same place you and I come from – our diverse society with its follies and foibles and large parts of it militancy infested and small parts of it radicalised. He also has his family and loved ones who can be compromised or put under threat. If the jawan is compromised, no system will be able to check the depredations. The terrorist does not even have to be smart. That stamp used to have certain secret features which identified the screener and made him accountable and less susceptible to compromise. In a hijacking situation, at Amritsar involving Indian Airlines flight IC 427, there was armed intervention by the security forces and a terrorist was killed. From the stamp on his boarding card, the screener who had let in two pistols with him was identified and apprehended. Was the stamping system stupid? No, I think, it was pretty smart actually. And, it cost very little, way less than all those fancy CCTV cameras and so on  whose efficacy for detecting a mischievous act by the screener is doubtful, at best.

Well, I resisted all the pressures to do away with the system, even incurring the wrath of the Minister. However, after I left the organisation, the system has been stopped. I doubt if anyone benefited from it. Meanwhile, the aviation security architecture is one layer less.