In
the IPS, a lot rides on what is called a charge posting. The postings prior to
that are all supposed to prepare you for this big thing for which you are
essentially recruited. This is the post of SP, DC, DCP, Commandant, etc. where
a lot of autonomy vests in you and in a substantive sense, the buck stops with
you. My first charge posting was as SP, Calcutta airport. In this post, my main
remit was to prevent and counter a hijack.
Soon after assuming charge in 1995, I enquired as to whether Calcutta airport had seen any hijacking incident in the recent past. On learning that there was one incident of hijacking where a hijacked plane was force-landed at Calcutta airport in 1990, I thought I should go through the files to learn more about a real-life incident. What I read shocked me.
On November 10, 1990, a Thai Airways
Airbus 300 (flight TG 305) was hijacked during a flight from Bangkok to Yangon
(Myanmar) by two Burmese students (Ye Marn and Ye Htink Yaw) and forced to land at Calcutta airport. There were 221
passengers and crew aboard.
It was a Saturday. The hijacked
aircraft landed at Calcutta airport in the afternoon. Coincidentally, the
Airport Director at the time happened to have returned to Calcutta airport
during my tenure after serving other postings in the interregnum. Immediately
when a hijacking takes place, several Committees of escalating importance swing
into action. A critical one is the Committee at the airport. A dedicated room
with the required gadgets, equipment and resources is earmarked for the
purpose. The Airport Director convenes this Committee which is headed by the
state Home Secretary or a very senior officer. The Airport Director received
the information at home and immediately rushed to the airport, a five-minute
distance. He tried to convene the Committee. However, these were pre-cellphone
days and further, the incident occurred on a holiday. The Committee Chairman
was not home and could not be contacted immediately. The other key person, the
SP, airport was also not home and he too could not be contacted. Some of the
other members who could be contacted, assembled, but in the absence of the
above two key persons, were completely at a loss as to what to do.
The hijackers sent a list of six
demands for the Myanmar government, viz., the release of all political prisoners including Aung San Suu
Kyi; the withdrawal of martial law and the abolition of all military tribunals;
the reopening of the universities which were closed down after the 1988
military coup; handing over of power to the National League for Democracy which
scored a landslide victory in the 1990 general elections, and so on. The
hijackers kept waiting and waiting but there was no response.
It would be four hours before the Committee Chairman and
the SP, airport could reach the airport. Meanwhile, the Burmese students,
seeing that no one was responding to them or talking to them, suspected that
there would be armed intervention so they called out to surrender, merely
requesting a Press Conference. Thus, inadvertent inaction had a fortunate
fallout. Even so, the situation lasted a good ten hours.
The contents of the file disturbed me greatly. These
hijackers were young students with grievances against another country. Their
demands also pertained to that country. The ‘weapon’ they used was a laughing
Buddha statue wrapped in tissue paper with some wires protruding from it. They
claimed it was a bomb but, in reality, it was innocuous. I shuddered to think
what would have happened if they were hardcore terrorists armed with lethal
weapons and with pressing demands for the Indian government. I rushed to meet the
Airport Director who substantiated all that I had read and also filled in the
gaps. I asked him whether the situation would be any better if, even as we were
talking, a plane was hijacked and involved Calcutta airport. He responded with
cautious optimism. I suggested we should visit the Committee Room. When we
reached there, we found that no one seemed to know where the key was. It took
one full hour to find the key and open the room. Upon entering, I found the
room to be full of cobwebs with a thick layer of dust on all the tables and
chairs. There were assorted landline phones some of which were hotlines to
various authorities. Hardly any of them was working. All this shook me up.
I felt that the way out was to have regular
mock exercises. Those days, cell phones were still some days away in the future
but pagers had just arrived. I armed all the Inspectors and Dy SPs with a pager
each and told them to rush to the airport in any available transport the moment
they received a message of hijacking or certain other specified incidents on
the pager. I also drew up a check list of who all needed to be contacted with
their telephone numbers and sequence of contact and hung it up at each office.
Many years later, when I got to head the Bureau
of Civil Aviation Security (BCAS), the aviation security regulator for the 100
or so airports in the country, the first thing I checked was the frequency of
the mock exercises. I found that only 10 % of the airports had conducted such an
exercise in the previous year. I kept stressing on mock exercises. Most of my
colleagues thought I was wasting time on something unimportant. Behind my back,
they used to mock my mock exercises. However, I persevered and before I
completed my tenure with BCAS, each single airport was conducting at least two
such exercises per year and also mock-exercised for other contingencies like
bomb threats, attack on the airport or aviation facilities, etc. under rigorous
monitoring. It paid off in spades on at least two occasions including when
Pathankot airport came under attack.
That's a problem, maybe specifically in India. Precautionary measures are treated as a joke till a disaster happens. Part of the 'Chalta hai' attitude, perhaps. Good that you changed it in your corner of the world.
ReplyDeleteYes, it's a problem in India except in Odisha, where they've taken disaster preparedness to an incredible level - way beyond any other country, even.
DeletePeople in our country don't believe in "Prevention is better than cure". We have SOPs in place, instructions in place but sadly very few in administration bother to go through and actually implement. It's some officers like you who make that effort. Kudos sir.
ReplyDeleteThanks. However, our disaster management efforts, with NDMA and NDRF in place, are of a high order. Mock drills need to be ramped up drastically, in all spheres. More importantly, rather than having 'nautankis' as mock drills, there need to be scenario building, rigorous debrief and monitoring so that mistakes in a past drill are not repeated in a current or future drill.
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