Tall people and their mango tales

A former CM used to take one week off in a year to rest and recuperate. When I was SDPO, he chose a forest resort in my sub division to do so. When the CM comes visiting, the big dignitaries in the district become small dignitaries. Thus, the DM becomes the usher boy, the SP becomes the darwan, the DFO becomes the forest guide and so on. SDOs and SDPOs are reduced to being mere errand boys. During that time, the government at the centre which was supported by the party in power in West Bengal was about to collapse and the Prime Minister tried to speak to the Chief Minister. However, in those pre-cellphone, trunk call days, the connections could not get established. That was a crisis of epic proportions. The Divisional Commissioner was furious and rushed off to “wake up those monkeys at the telephone exchange,” as he put it. In my capacity as errand boy-cum-announcer, I accompanied him so that I could precede him and announce his arrival in hushed but important, sibilant tones to the telephone guys. When we reached the exchange, we found exactly one guy nodding off on his table. I duly announced. As he was slowly coming to life, the Commissioner started a barrage of abuses. He raved and ranted for almost ten minutes. At the end of which, the guy just said, “Hobe na,” meaning, no can do. Those two bored words put an abrupt full stop to all that sound and fury of the preceding hour. I guess, the government at the Centre would still have collapsed even if the PM and CM had connected on phone that day. 

The next morning, I found that the pilot of the helicopter by which the CM had travelled had taken seriously ill due to suspected food poisoning. Since no one else in the entourage had any problem, I investigated the matter a little further. What happened was, this particular pilot used to think of himself as no less than the CM. He came strutting around and demanded all kinds of luxuries including the choicest booze. By the evening, most of the guys were thoroughly pissed off with his demands. I was told that a Dy SP took an empty Black Label bottle, filled it with the local brew, Changta and palmed it off as the real thing. Even strong men with zinc-lined stomachs shudder at the thought of having Changta but the poor pilot was taken in. The rest was history – or, at least, complete bed rest for a few days. Luckily, he recovered before the CM was due back.

 

Subsequent to that infamous price rise leading to the fall of Delhi government in 1998, in West Bengal, there were daily meetings chaired by a senior Minister. As DCP, I used to accompany CP, Calcutta to these meetings. One day, the honourable Minister said, “Look, West Bengal accounts for the highest potato production in the country. The people here will forgive us anything else but won’t tolerate an increase in the potato price. Let’s stop export of potato to other states for the time being.” Accordingly, we stopped all the outbound trucks transporting potato to other states. The next day, there was an emergency meeting in the Minister’s chamber. Apparently, in response to the potato ban, the Andhra CM had given a press statement that fish export from Andhra to West Bengal would be stopped. Andhra accounted for a huge percentage of the fish consumed here (70 %, I was told). This was apocalypse! So, exports to Andhra were reluctantly allowed, under duress, and all of us were tasked to report the price of different types of fish in each market on a daily basis.

 

In my cadre, there is a system of calling on the senior officers when one joins a new assignment. The system was corrupted so much that in the district where I joined as SP, there was also a system of calling on the DCS, the local big leader of the ruling party. When told about it, I was a little revolted. For me, my senior officers were mai baap, real mothers and fathers. Given that, I didn’t want to acquire excess luggage like step-mothers and step-fathers in the form of politicians so I didn’t bother about the calling on bit. After waiting for the courtesy call, the DCS must’ve become furious. When I went to Calcutta after a week for the calling on with the senior officers, my first port of call was the Home Secretary. After the pleasantries, he asked me what I’d done to enrage the DCS who had gone complaining about me to all and sundry. I said how was that possible as I was only one week into the assignment. Then he burst out laughing. He said, “No, the guy was complaining that your English was weak. When I asked him why, he said, shuddu ektai word jaane, NO [the only word you know is NO]. Whatever his party members were asking, e.g., don’t arrest our supporters, arrest the other side in cooked-up cases, inform us before starting a case and so on, you’re just saying NO.”

 

The District Magistrate and SP behave like lords in the districts. As SP of the district, I used to be invited for some parties. I attended very few of them but used to land up at the appointed time, to the consternation of all. I found that, actually, there are people designated in the DM and SP’s retinue who ring up to find out whether the other guests had arrived and only after that was so, the laat sahebs (DM and SP) would make an appearance. Sounds silly? Actually, we can be very silly.

 

Oonche log aur unki aam baaten. Tall people and their mango tales. 

 

[To be continued]

S & M

 

My brother lost an almost brand new bicycle. It had six gears – the big thing then. It was stolen when he was tutoring a kid for some pocket money. We went down to the nearby police station to lodge an FIR. We waited and waited near the Duty Officer’s desk for about three hours before we were attended to. The Duty Officer was a young guy, very pleasant. He told us ki stationery nahin hai, humein hi lana padega. My brother went out and got back with a few sheets of white paper after about an hour because there was no stationery shop nearby. The Duty Officer laughed. He said minimum one ream was required – how did we think police stations ran! Another one round, another one hour. This time, with a bond of one ream of paper forged between us, he decided to be frank. Chhota case hei, lekin sau rupaiya toh lagega. I had just joined the service and did not know the ways of the world. I bristled and told him I was an IPS probationer. He apologised and said, “Saab, aap IPS hain toh pachaas rupaiya mein ho jaayega.” 

This is a true story.

 

After thirty odd years in the job, I ask myself, has anything changed? Yes. We have big and great management experts at the top “doing” digital policing, sensitisation, proactive, community policing, CCTNS (that never–ending policing digitisation initiative) and so on. On the ground – will a police station be my first port of call if I am in distress? Not at all. It will pretty much be the last on the list.

 

Why should this be so? The default option for police is not crime investigation. The default option is S&M. No, it’s not Sadism/ Masochism – it’s the two most revered words in the police lexicon that outsiders never hear about: Suppression and Minimisation. This is possibly the best kept secret of the force since early British days. What are they, exactly?

 

Like most police officers in a supervisory capacity, my days as a zonal Additional Superintendent of Police used to begin with a perusal of the daily Situation Report (sitrep) delivered at my house at six A. M.. It contained all the cases registered during the previous 24 hours in various police stations under my watch. The first column contained the Special Report (SR) cases. These were cases pertaining to heinous crimes like murder, dacoity, etc which merited close supervision of the senior officers and which could be “closed” only with the approval of the Deputy Inspector General of the range. One morning, I checked through the sitrep and found no SR case and breathed easy. Later in the morning someone informed me that in one of the police stations under my watch there was a brutal dacoity with murder the previous night. As far as crimes went, this was the top of the tree, ranking the highest in SR cases, way above anything else but the sitrep was clean as a whistle. I went down to the concerned police station to investigate my investigators.

 

No SR case was registered in the previous 24 hours. So I opted to go through all the cases. The only case was a minor one of someone trying to misappropriate some abandoned property. On closer examination, I found that the property was stolen from a dead body. A minor case, still. What about the body? There was no case because it was filed under “Unnatural Death,” the same as when someone drowns or is bitten by a snake. So, a brutal dacoity when the inmate was murdered was reduced to an unnatural death and misappropriation of abandoned property. The figures look good on the floor of the Parliament and the state Assembly. They look good when the SP or the Additional SP reports to his superiors. Do they look good to the family of the victim? Do they look good to their neighbours? Do they look good to the society at large? This is the second part – Minimisation.

 

The first part – Suppression – is something else. This is when nothing happens. This is where art and human ingenuity meet IPC and Cr PC (Indian Penal Code and Criminal Procedure Code, respectively). Throughout my career as an underling, as a supervisory officer and as that all powerful figure called SP and DCP, I found that crime is what the SP/ DCP deems it to be. Unlike in other services, cops do not hold too many meetings. There is a monthly Crime Conference by the SP/ DCP where he declares what his objectives and guidelines for the force are. If he decides that dacoities should not exceed 10 in a particular month, the number of dacoity cases across police stations under his watch for that month stop at 9.99 or whatever but do not exceed or equal 10.

 

A citizen is “entitled” to register a case under proper section/s of law. Must this “nudge, nudge, wink, wink” regime continue? What will happen if one DGP in one state will one day wake up and say, no – henceforth, all complaints will be registered under the proper section of law? It happened in West Bengal – possibly under judicial duress, in Jalpaiguri district because of judicial wrangles regarding siting of a High Court and was called the Jalpaiguri experiment. But why be forced? Why not be proactive in this regard?

Mad Monkey III: Smoke and mirrors

 

On December 22, 2001, a British terrorist, Richard Reid boarded American airlines flight 63 from Paris to Miami wearing special shoes packed with plastic explosives in their hollowed-out bottoms. He tried unsuccessfully to detonate the same but was overpowered by the other passengers and flight crew. After this incident (referred to as the ‘shoe-bomber incident’), the shoes came in for special screening by security staff all over the world and many countries require shoes to be taken off at the screening checkpoint. 

On September 13, 2005, a wheelchair-bound passenger, Porfirio Ramirez and his son hijacked a Colombian airliner after boarding the same at Florencia for Bogota. The weapons used were two live grenades hidden in Porforio’s diapers. After this incident, screening of sick/ wheelchair-bound passengers became more stringent; the wheelchairs were screened separately and particular attention was paid to plaster cast, prosthetics, etc.. This has created a lot of furore from genuine passengers with ailment or disability and has raised concerns about privacy issues and dignity.

 

After an extensive surveillance operation in 2006, the British Police uncovered a terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on board aircrafts flying from the United Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The explosives were to be disguised as soft drinks. At least seven flights were targeted by 18 suicide bombers and several associates. 24 persons were arrested in this connection in and around London on August 9, 2006. Seven of the accused persons have been convicted. This incident was followed by severe restrictions on carrying of liquids in hand baggage by several countries. Gradually, the restrictions have been relaxed and passengers are allowed to carry 100 ml containers of liquid, aerosol and gels (LAGs) up to a maximum of one litre. Liquids of higher quantity purchased in the SHA can be carried on board only if they are packed in Security Tamper Evident Bags (STEBs) by the retailer and checked at the aircraft gate. 

On June 30, 2007, a jeep loaded with propane canisters was driven at the glass doors of Glasgow airport terminal by two terrorists and set on fire, causing injury to several passengers. This incident brought to the fore the possibilities of landside attacks and has led to fixed and hydraulic bollards at the entrance to airport terminals, check posts and barriers on the approach road to the airports and permanent obstructions in front of the terminals to obstruct motor vehicles. 

On December 25, 2009, a Nigerian terrorist travelling from Amsterdam to Detroit on Northwest flight 253, attempted to detonate plastic explosives sewn into his underwear by injecting acid into it through a syringe to cause a chemical reaction. He succeeded in causing a fire and a small explosion but was overpowered by fellow passengers. Hitherto, all screening was geared towards detecting metal because it was presumed that detonation could not take place without involvement of metallic device for the charging. However, this incident showed possibilities of triggering explosions without using metal. This led to more emphasis on pat-down search and also reinforced the restrictions on liquids, aerosols and gels. 

On October 29, 2010, two packages, each containing plastic explosives hidden inside printer cartridges and a detonating mechanism were discovered on cargo planes in flights from Yemen to the United States at en route stopovers in UK and Dubai. The bombs were primed to be activated by a cell phone alarm shortly before the planes landed. Prior to this incident, security around cargo and cargo planes was lax. However, this cargo could have been trans-shipped through passenger planes also and any contamination of cargo would compromise the security architecture of the entire aviation system. This led the policy makers to tighten cargo security. Cargo was mandated to go through 100 % screening. The distinction between passenger and all-cargo aircrafts for security purposes was abolished. In India, there has been creation of cargo SHA, armed guarding of main entry and exit to cargo complexes and continuous CCTV (Closed Circuit Television) and manual surveillance of airside and Security Restricted Area (SRA) as well as city side proximate areas including car parking area. 

On January 24, 2011, a suicide bomber carried out an attack at the baggage claim area of the international arrival hall of Moscow’s Domodedovo airport killing 37 and injuring 173. India already had entry restrictions into the arrival and departure areas. After this incident, in India, ID proof was made mandatory for even visitors with entry tickets. Many airports around the world started screening and restricting entry into all areas of the airports including areas which were unrestricted earlier. 

On March 8, 2014, Malaysian Airlines flight 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing disappeared after losing contact 38 minutes after take-off. The aircraft has not been traced and the 227 passengers and 12 crew aboard are all presumed dead. The security response has included mandates for increased battery life on underwater locator beacons, lengthening of recording times on flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders, and new standards for aircraft position reporting over the open ocean. 

On March 24, 2015, Germanwings flight 9525 from Barcelona to Dusseldorf was deliberately crashed by the co-pilot while the captain was out of the cockpit, killing all the 144 passengers and six crew members. This led to regulations requiring the presence of two authorised persons in the cockpit at all times and also tightening of measures against insider threat, e.g., security vetting of all staff, 100 % screening of all staff and their baggage before entering Security Restricted Area, etc.. 

These then are the genesis of all the inconveniences one faces while travelling by air. Even so, aviation security remains smoke-and-mirrors. Actually, when good guys try to imagine bad things, they are not very good at it. Like we do our research and development, the terrorists also carry out their own R&D to find newer ways to breach the defences. Plus, they need to be lucky just once, the security guys, every single time; thus, the probabilities favour the other side. A well-informed terrorist knows that there are thousands of loopholes and building a dyke to bulwark it all would bring air travel to a standstill. So, somewhere between bluster and business, between theatre and substance, we, the security guys chug along. Literally on a wing and a prayer.

Mad Monkey II: The game changer

 

The turning point in aviation security (AVSEC) came on September 11, 2001, commonly referred to as 9/11 when four commercial aircrafts which took off from three different airports in the United States were hijacked mid-air by 19 Al-Qaeda terrorists in a coordinated attack; two of the aeroplanes crashed into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York both of which collapsed, one aeroplane crashed into the west side of the Pentagon, the headquarters of U.S. military and one aeroplane targeting either the White House or the Capitol Building crashed in a field as the passengers fought the hijackers. The death toll is estimated at around 3,000 and almost 6,000 persons have been estimated to have been injured in the incidents. This was the first time that aircrafts were used as weapons, with devastating effect. Prior to this incident, there were widely variable standards of aviation security enforcement practised by different countries. Countries which were not much affected by terrorist incidents did not imbue civil aviation security with adequate seriousness. 9/11 changed all that. Worldwide, policy planners and governments woke up to the seriousness of the threats related to civil aviation security and to the realisation that no aviation operation is safe unless all aviation operation is safe from terrorist depredations. As a result, worldwide, AVSEC and screening procedures became more stringent and International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) sought to initiate measures for closer monitoring. 

Several studies were undertaken to analyse the failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks. The Unites States set up a 9/11 Commission which submitted its final report in 2004. One Transport Security Administration study found that before 9/11, although there was registered baggage reconciliation with the passengers, only 5 % of the baggage was screened for explosives. According to an FAA evaluation at major airports in the United States, hand bag and passenger screeners missed approximately 20 % of potentially dangerous items.

After 9/11, many countries passed laws to make aviation security more robust and there have been growing “surveillance state” and “safety state.” Surveillance has involved monitoring of suspect persons and groups on a continuous basis and safety state is a regime of a broad range of policies which may include Advance Passenger Information (API), Passenger Name Record (PNR), watch lists, no-fly lists, etc. and coordinated plan for security. Post 9/11 period has seen enhanced front-end screening, increase in security staff hiring, shift of screening from private operators and outsourced agencies to governmental agencies, upgradation and integration of security technology, especially explosives detection systems and improvement of training practices and standards. These new measures included “social sorting” whereby certain groups of passengers were marked out for differential security screening treatment. Prior to 9/11, Germany’s asylum policies were liberal. Investigations revealed that some of the terrorists involved in the 9/11 attacks had taken advantage of this and resided for some time in Germany. Post 9/11, German Parliament passed Air Security Act that contained a number of regulations for harsher security screening at airports and empowered the government to take military measures to deal with terrorism aboard an aircraft. Other new laws addressed effectiveness of intelligence and law enforcement. Canada enacted Canadian Anti-Terrorism Act. United Kingdom passed the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005. New Zealand enacted the Terrorism Suppression Act, 2002. The United States created the Department of Homeland Security for coordination of all anti-terrorism efforts and enacted USA Patriot Act. The Act gave the government the authority to detain foreign terror suspects for a week before being charged. It also gave sweeping powers for monitoring telephone communications, email and internet use by terror suspects. The biggest change in the United States was the creation of Transport Security Administration which took over the screening of passengers and luggage from airports and private agencies and also exercised oversight on the entire gamut of AVSEC. All the registered baggage was screened for explosives through four methods: an Explosives Detection System (EDS), Explosives Trace Detection (ETD) machines, bomb-sniffing dogs and manual bag searches. As a result, EDS and ETD screen 90 % of the baggage. The remaining baggage was checked by bomb sniffing dogs and manual searches. There was massive increase in recruitment and training of screeners. Post 9/11, many countries assigned Air Marshals to flights. Bullet-proof cockpit doors with cameras were installed to alert the pilot/s of suspicious activities in the cabin. Countries like Sweden, Norway and Finland which had only a system of random security checks for domestic flights switched to 100 % screening. Some airports installed “dirty bomb” detectors.

Both the process and technology for screening of passengers, baggage and cargo have undergone major transformation. All passengers and crew are made to go through a sterile hold area (SHA) where they are admitted only after security screening of their person and hand baggage. In some countries, certain categories of persons, e.g., flight crew were exempted from screening. That has been sought to be stopped. The lists of another category of persons, VVIPs (Very Very Important Persons), who were earlier exempted from screening, have been pared down. The training standards of the screeners have been enhanced. Many countries have introduced body scanners and specialised detectors to “recognise” certain types of threats. Bigger airports have introduced in-line baggage screening HBS systems to screen registered baggage. Cargo screening agents have been brought under the regulatory and audit ambit of the security regulators of the country. Some countries have introduced a cargo SHA also.